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To notify or not to notify the Commission of the European Communities
(hereinafter "Commission") in Brussels of agreements if and when they
pertain to business in the Common Market, has continued as one of the
unsolved riddles of EEC competition law practice for many years. The
legality, hence enforceability, under EEC competition law of an agreement
containing restrictive provisions depends on a system of institutionalized
analysis so entirely different from what American practitioners have come
to expect regarding their latitude to include certain restrictive, yet reason-
able clauses in their agreements in the United States, that some general
reflections are in point. The following, therefore, is intended to assist the
American practitioner by first explaining the notification system. Second,
the EEC law governing distribution agreements is analyzed with special
attention given to selective and exclusive distribution agreements. Recent
regulations of the EEC governing exclusive distribution and purchasing
agreements are then described, and last, some practical comments about
how practitioners might best proceed are offered.
A. ROLE OF NOTIFICATION
The system in the EEC is based on a division into, on the one hand, a
rather formalistic application by the Commission of the pertinent law, i.e.
Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome,1 to all restraints of business conduct
*Member of Schwartz, Klink, Schreiber, New York City. The author is Vice Chairman of the
European Law Committee of the A.B.A. Section on International Law and Practice, and
Adjunct Professor, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
II (entered into force January 1, 1958), also referred to as EEC Treaty. This treaty represents
118 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
found in an agreement, and, on the other hand, an economic analysis of pro-
and anticompetitive effects of such restraints not until a special administra-
tive procedure has been opened in Brussels, following "notification" of the
agreement, i.e., formal application for an approval of the restraints pur-
suant to Article 85(3). The practical difficulties resulting from this system
center on the question of what flexibility exists, if any, for businessmen and
their legal advisers to decide whether to file a notification in respect of their
agreements.
2
At the outset, it should be stated that no legal obligation exists in EEC law
to notify any agreement. Notification is only employed, if a company or
person desires to obtain an approval from the Commission for its agree-
ments otherwise violative of Article 85(1). Consequently, the omission to
notify any specific agreement does not have any automatic legal result,
particularly does not lead to the prohibition of the agreement, since the
applicable regulations of EEC law governing the process of notification have
not added anything to the prohibitions in the underlying substantive law
contained in Article 85(1).3 Whether or not a particular contractual arrange-
ment is prohibited in the EEC depends solely on the interpretation of
Article 85(1) with respect to such arrangement, not its notification to the
Commission.
the charter of the Common Market. Articles without further specification mentioned in the text
will be those of the Treaty of Rome, or EEC Treaty. Article 85(1) provides:
"The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market and in
particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of sup-
plementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have
no connection with the subject of such contracts."
2. The system goes back to basic principles borrowed from French and German administra-
tive law at the time EEC competition law was first created, giving an administrative agency sole
control over the permissibility of certain contractual arrangements, subject only to the jurisdic-
tion of the European Court of Justice. The system has been criticized in the literature,
particularly by British scholars and practitioners who did not participate in its creation and who,
by tradition, are less inclined to entrust administrative agencies with such powers, rather
preferring adjudication by the courts; cf., for instance, the criticism voiced by Valentine Korah,
The Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity-The Need for a Rule of Reason in EEC Antitrust, in
Symposium on the European Economic Community, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 320, 348 et seq.
(1981). See also, Van Bael, A Practitioner's Guide to Due Process in EEC Antitrust and
Antidumping Proceedings, 18 INT'L LAW 841 (1984).
3. Socit6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (LTM v. MBU) Court of
Justice, June 30, 1966, Case 56/65, 12 Rec. 337 [1966], Common Market Reports (CCH)
8047 (hereinafter "C.M.R.". Pages of Court decisions cited in this article will always be those
in C.M.R., not the official Court reports).
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B. WHY NOTIFY?
On the other hand, there are advantages resulting from notification and,
by the same token, risks attached to not notifying agreements which may be
subject to Article 85(1). The most obvious effect of a notification is the
immunity from fines pursuant to Article 15(5)(a), Regulation 17/62. 4 No
agreement or contractual provision pertaining to the Common Market that
has been notified can attract a fine, provided the notification is comprehen-
sive and truthful. However, since ordinary, business-like arrangements of
the kind typically entered into by companies such as distribution or licensing
agreements are not likely to result in fines, even if they violate Article
85(1), 5 a more practical consideration is the following. American manufac-
turers and/or licensors may wish to protect their trade secrets and other
valuable assets, temporarily provided to, or shared with, a European dis-
tributor or licensee, and they will want to secure the return of their tangible
or intangible property at contract termination and, of course, the punctual
payment of any monies agreed upon with the European partner. If the
language contained in a contract provision pertaining to any of these
arrangements goes beyond the permissible limits under Article 85(1), the
whole agreement is in danger of being void, and certainly the particular
contract provision would not be enforceable, resulting from the interplay of
Article 85(1) and Article 85(2).
In such a situation, to avoid the nullity or partial nullity resulting from an
arrangement subject to Article 85(1) the only sensible thing to do (short of
changing the agreement) is the notification of the agreement. 6 Only in this
way will companies doing business in Europe be able to avail themselves of
the opportunity to obtain an "exemption," or approval, for their arrange-
ment from the Commission, if the particular prerequisites of Article 85(3)
4. Official Journal of the European Communities ("O.J.") (Special ed. 1959-1962), p. 87.
For a more detailed discussion of the legal effects of notification, see H. SMIT and P.E. HERZOG,
THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY (1976)
(supplements), points 85.04 and 85.32 to 85.39. See also C. BELLAMY and G. CHILD, COMMON
MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION, 111 et seq. (2nd ed., 1978).
5. An exception are export bans preventing trade between EEC member states on a
secondary level of distribution. Cf., as one of many examples Commission Decision of Nov. 25,
1980, in the matter of Johnson & Johnson Inc., O.J. No. L 337, p. 16, Dec. 31, 1980; C.M.R.
10,227.
6, Admittedly, notification in and of itself does not provide legal certainty with respect to the
enforceability of the notified agreement. It is not until a formal decision granting "exemption"
has been taken by the Commission that the agreement can be relied upon. See further
discussion of this subject later in the text. When such exemption has been received, the
notifying company (companies) can rely upon the agreement as against anyone, including third
parties, L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe A.M.C.K., Court of Justice, December 11, 1980, Case 31/80,
[1980] E.C.R. 3775, C.M.R. 8715, at p. 8608. The exemption can be, and frequently is
granted retroactively to the date of notification, Article 6(1), Regulation 17/62. This is impor-
tant since it sometimes takes years before the Commission gets around to granting an exemp-
tion. Cf. infra note 22.
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are fulfilled in the circumstances. The question remains, though, what type
of agreement is subject to Article 85(1) and thus a candidate for notification.
Article 85(1) prohibits all agreements or concerted practices that have the
object or effect of preventing, restricting, or distorting competition within
the Common Market and may affect trade between EEC member states. 7
Broadly speaking, this embraces all agreements containing any kind of
restriction, geographic or substantive, of a party's right to conduct its
business freely. If they are capable of affecting trade within the Common
Market, such agreements involve the risk of violating Article 85(l), sub-
ject only to the de minimis exception excluding agreements of minor
importance, 8 or unless specific clearance of the restrictive provision in
question has been given by decision of the Commission or the European
Court of Justice (hereinafter "CoJ") in a prior case.
As is apparent, the threshold of the prohibition contained in Article 85(1)
is extremely low. The prohibition catches many more contractual arrange-
ments than appear sensible from an American businessman's point of view. 9
Americans are used to the system of self-assessment provided by United
States antitrust law and permitting businessmen and their lawyers to decide,
albeit at their own risk, whether a restrictive contractual provision, despite
its anticompetitive character, is acceptable as a reasonable business arrange-
ment ancillary to an otherwise lawful purpose. In the EEC no such latitude
exists, due to the wide-ranging scope of Article 85(l). Instead, a check must
7. The width of this prohibition is not unlike that of the Sherman Antitrust Act, Section 1, 15
U.S.C. 1, and was designed to implement the basic objectives of the Treaty of Rome, i.e., the
realization of a single market among sovereign states by removing the existing obstacles to free
trade in the Community; cf. Italy v. EEC Council and EEC Commission, Court of Justice, July
13, 1966, Case 32/65; 12 Rec. 563 [1966], C.M.R. 8048, at pp. 7717/8. For more background
and the rationale behind the Common Market's competition rules enshrined in the Treaty of
Rome, and subsequently promulgated through regulations of the EEC Council and/or the EEC
Commission, see U. TOEPKE, EEC COMPETITION LAW, BUSINESS ISSUES AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES
IN COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST CASES, 19-96 (hereinafter cited as TOEPKE, EEC COMPETITION
LAW).
8. See Commission Notice of 19 December 1977 Concerning Agreements of Minor Impor-
tance Which Do Not Fall Under Article 85(1) Of The Treaty Establishing The European
Economic Community; O.J. No. C 313, December 29, 1977, p. 3. Generally speaking, the
Commission has taken the view in this Notice that agreements must exert an "appreciable"
impact on the market position, i.e., sales outlets and supply possibilities, of third parties and of
consumers for Article 85(1) to apply. "Appreciable" is defined quantitatively by using as a
threshold a 5% market share with respect to the products in question, or substitutes, and a
combined annual sales limit of 50 million European units of account for the contracting parties.
However, the Commission has cautioned readers of its Notice that the quantitative definition of
the term "appreciable" is not an absolute yardstick.
9. An exception are agreements that benefit from one of the Common Market's so-called
"block exemptions," as for instance, the Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1983/83 regarding
exclusive distribution agreements of June 22, 1983, O.J. No. L 173, p. 1, June 30, 1983, and the
corresponding Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1984/83 regarding exclusive purchasing
agreements, of the same date, O.J. No. L 173, p. 5. Both regulations are the subject of detailed
discussion later in this article.
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be made on a case-by-case basis, taking guidance from the jurisprudence of
the CoJ and numerous decisions of the Commission, to determine whether a
specific restriction contained in a distribution or patent licensing agreement,
for example, has been held to fall outside the scope of Article 85(1), i.e.,
below the threshold of the prohibition;10 if no such precedent exists, chances
are that the broad language in Article 85(1) will be interpreted to apply to
the restriction.
The effect of this broad language in Article 85(1) is drastic. Pursuant to its
corollary, Article 85(2), all agreements violating Article 85(1), either wholly
or in part, are null and void, to the extent of the infringement. I However,
this effect is tempered by Article 85(3) which authorizes, under certain
defined conditions, the granting of exemptions from the prohibition con-
tained in Article 85(1).12 The Commission has sole power to grant such
exemptions,' 3 following a formalized notification including the use of a
10. The discussion below will focus on restrictions in distribution agreements and their
treatment by the CoJ and the Commission. With respect to patent licensing agreements the
following have been held to fall outside the prohibition in Article 85(1), among others:
nonexclusive grant-back license, sublicensing prohibition, export prohibitions relating to non-
EEC countries, information exchange regarding patent improvements and secret know-how,
obligation to keep secret know-how confidential, quality controls by licensor. For more detail,
including the decisions that have so held, see TOEPKE, EEC COMPETITION LAW, supra note 7, at
Chapter 53, 349 et seq.
II. Article 85(2) states as follows: "Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this
Article shall be automatically void." In LTM v. MBU, supra note 3, the Court established the
rule that Article 85(2) applies only to the prohibited contract provision, not to the whole
agreement, unless the particular clause cannot be separated from the agreement without
destroying the whole arrangement ("doctrine of severability").
12. There are four conditions for the application of Article 85(3) which can be grouped into
two distinct categories, the first requiring certain positive effects of the agreement in issue, the
second proscribing certain negative effects. All of them must be fulfilled, that is, the positive
effects must be present and the negative ones must be absent, before the Commission may issue
an exemption decision. In short, Article 85(1) may be declared inapplicable to an agreement
pursuant to Article 85(3), if the agreement (i) contributes to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while (ii) allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not (iii) impose on the
contracting parties restrictions that are not indispensable to the attainment of the agreement's
objectives, or (iv) afford the contracting parties the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
13. Article 9(1), Regulation 17/62. It has been suggested that this provision is invalid as
contrary to primary EEC law contained in the Treaty, i.e., Article 85, which is directly
applicable in member states and hence subject to adjudication in its entirety by member state
courts, see Korah, supra note 2, at p. 353. The argument is not persuasive to this author as it
neglects the division of competence between civil and administrative branches of the judiciary,
typical in continental Europe, the CoJ in this case representing the administrative court and the
Commission deciding the issue of exemption as the authority of the first instance.
Addressing the issue of competence of a member state court under Article 85 in a 1980
judgment the CoJ held: "The jurisdiction of the national courts is restricted to determining
whether the agreement, decision or concerted practice which is the subject of the action before
them is in accordance with Article 85(1) and, if appropriate, to declaring the agreement,
decision or practice in question void under Article 85(2)." L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe A.M.C.K.,
CoJ of December 11, 1980, Case 31/80 [19801 E.C.R. 3775, C.M.R. 8715, at p. 8607.
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particular form.' 4 Since the Commission can grant an exemption only in
response to such a formal notification 15 which leads to an administrative
procedure requiring the Commission to engage in a balancing process of
positive and negative consequences of the agreement with respect to com-
petition and the competitive structure of the market,16 the exemption proce-
dure constitutes, so to speak, an institutionalized rule of reason approach in
EEC competition law.'
7
1. Avoid Unenforceability in National Courts
Thus, under the European system a private contract must be notified to
the Commission to avoid its unenforceability in national courts, if it violates
14. Form A/B, see Article 4(1), Regulation 27/62, O.J. (Special Edition 1959-1962), p.
132. This form is presently under review by the Commission, c.f. Commission Press Release
No. IP (84) 484, of Dec. 21, 1984, C.M.R. § 10,656. At present, the form requires disclosure of
significant details of the subject agreement, and it cannot be dispensed with during the
notification process, FEDETAB v. Commission, CoJ of October 29, 1980, Cases 209 to 215,
and 218/78, [1980] E.C.R. 3125, C.M.R. 8687. However, business secrets may not be divulged
by the Commission, see Article 20, Regulation 17/62. The form must be filed by the parties to
the agreement, either jointly or separately, but it may also be filed by their counsel or other
representative provided written proof of authority is attached. For more detail see B. CAWTHRA,
RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE E.E.C.: THE NEED TO NOTIFY, (1972).
15. Distillers Company Ltd. v. Commission, CoJ of July 10, 1980, Case 30/78, [1980] E.C.R.
2229, C.M.R. 8613 held that notification of the agreement is an essential requirement for
exemption under Article 85(3) and that the Commission's unofficial knowledge of the agree-
ment or any of its provisions does not suffice, id., at p. 7255. For details see TOEPKE, EEC
COMPETITION LAW, supra note 7, at 60 and 709 et seq.
16. See Ets. Consten and Grundig Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission (Grundig, Consten),
CoJ of July 13, 1966, Cases 56 and 58/64, 12 Rec. 429 [1966], C.M.R. 8046, where the Court
held: "In evaluating the relative importance of the various parts of the agreement, the
Commission also had to evaluate their effect in relation to an objectively ascertainable im-
provement in the production and distribution of the products and to determine whether the
resulting advantage was enough to make the restrictions on competition appear essential." Id.,
at p. 7656. In its judgment in Perfumes the Court said: "Before taking a decision of exemption,
it is necessary to assess the advantages which are likely to be derived therefrom for consumers,
having regard to the scope of the special restrictions which they involve .... Procureur v.
Giry and Guerlain et al., CoJ of July 10, 1980, Cases 253/78 and 1 to 3/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2327,
C.M.R. 8712, p. 8528.
17. The "rule of reason" itself, well-known to American practitioners, is not applicable in
EEC antitrust law, contrary to what has been written and said by several scholars elsewhere.
The European Court of Justice had to deal with this issue as early as 1966 when it decided its first
genuine antitrust case, namely Grundig, Consten, supra note 16. There, the plaintiffs had
argued that the Commission decision prohibiting their distribution agreement was a violation of
Article 85(1), since the Commission, before declaring that Article 85(1) is applicable, should
have considered the economic effects of the contract in question on competition between the
various brands, i.e., should have avoided a per se prohibition in the interest of a reasonable
application of the law (rule of reason approach); cf, Grundig, Consten, C.M.R. 8046, at pp.
7640 and 7652. The Court rejected this argument in its decision of July, 1966, as follows:
"Competition between producers is generally more apparent than competition between distrib-
utors of the same brand. This does not, however, mean that an agreement that restricts
competition between distributors should escape the prohibition of Article 85, paragraph 1,
because it might strengthen competition between producers." Id., at p. 7652.
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Article 85(1). While it is true, due to the doctrine of severability, that not the
entire agreement would be null and void as a result of a single provision, or
even several provisions violating Article 85(1), it is usually the essential
provisions of an agreement that are likely to cause concern given the breadth
of Article 85(1), such as provisions regarding the scope of a license to sell or
produce, the rights and obligations to purchase raw materials and to use
know-how, the commitment to refrain from canvassing in certain parts of
the Common Market, and the like. If such clauses are in fact beyond the
threshold of Article 85(1) and thus require a specific exemption from the
Commission pursuant to Article 85(3) before they can be enforced in a
national court,' 8 the American businessman entering into a contract with a
European partner without notifying it to the Commission risks that he may
not be paid, that his trade secrets are not protected, or that other provisions
of the contract will not be binding as he expects, based on his contract's
language.
A recent judgment of the CoJ is a demonstration of the problem.19
Restrictive clauses contained in a private agreement among companies from
two separate member states of the Community were held to be incompatible
with Article 85(1), yet had not been notified to the Commission. A German
court hearing the case will now have to decide the consequences of partial
nullity of the agreement under private German law.2° If in a given case
involving an American firm the parties had agreed on a United States forum
for the settlement of their disputes, it is entirely possible that a European
defendant, under similar circumstances, would raise and ultimately suc-
18. This possibility of exemption exists in all situations described in Article 85(1), at least
theoretically. Thus, there is no per se violation of this EEC law. Cf. The Commission's
statements to this effect in Annual Report on Competition Policy ("Comp. Rep.") 1975 (Fifth),
point 10. However, certain violations of Article 85(1) are so blatant that chances of an
exemption are close to zero and that they therefore approximate what would be called a perse
violation in the United States. An example are clauses designed to partition national markets in
the EEC, such as export prohibitions leading to absolute territorial protection, cf. Comp. Rep.
1979, point 99; for more detail see TOEPKE, EEC COMPETITION LAW, supra note 7, at 445 etseq.
19. See Socidtd de vente de Ciments et B6tons de l'Est v. Kerpen & Kerpen GmbH, CoJ of
December 14, 1983, Case 319/82, [1983] E.C.R.-(not yet published).
20. In a contract for the annual supply of certain amounts of cement the French supplier had
agreed with the German buyer that the latter would use the cement mainly for its own purposes
and not sell to the Saar region. The buyer breached these obligations and claimed, in the lawsuit
following termination of the contract by the French supplier, invalidity of these provisions
under Article 85(1) and (2). The argument prevailed since restrictive provisions of this kind
violate Article 85(1) and are void, if they appreciably affect intra-EEC trade, according to the
CoJ. This is the case where the contract volume reaches close to 10% of a member state's
exports of a specific product to another member state. The French cement manufacturer now
faces defeat in the National court (the Court of Appeals in Saarbruicken) on the issues of
contract termination and enjoining of sales, but it could have protected itself better had it
attempted to obtain an exemption for its supply contract from the Commission. The author,




ceed, even in the United States, on the question of enforceability of any such
contract provision incompatible with EEC law.21
2. Drafting Challenge: How to Circumvent Notification
The challenge for anyone drafting an agreement relating to business
activities to which EEC law will apply therefore lies in avoiding contractual
restrictions that would, to be enforceable, require an exemption from, and
hence a notification to the Commission. 22 The task may seem difficult, and
in certain situations a notification will be inevitable to make for a particular
provision's enforceability. It should be remembered however, that, accord-
ing to existing case law of the CoJ and the decision practice of the Commis-
sion to date, several types of restrictive contract clauses fall outside the
prohibition in Article 85(1). They are therefore below the threshold of EEC
incompatibility. Others benefit from statutory exemption by way of the
regulations existing in EEC law that provide for categories of agreements to
escape the prohibition of Article 85(1) (so-called group or block exemp-
tions). Examples are the new regulations of June 1983 covering exclusive
distribution and exclusive purchasing.23 In these situations there is no need
to notify the agreement. The trick is to negotiate and write contracts that
only contain provisions belonging into these categories of restrictions-
provided this is feasible from a business standpoint, given the particular
requirements of the companies involved.
21. A question of separate dimension relates to the compensation for possible damages of
the United States company that may result from such lack of enforceability. The question is
whether an indemnification by the European firm, based on its failure to notify the agreement
despite an obligation to do so (which would have to be written into the agreement), might help
the American firm, or whether this would raise insurmountable concerns of public (European)
policy. This is probably a close question, depending on the circumstances, and can only be
decided on an individual basis.
22. This is dictated by simple pragmatism. The Commission may not take action upon a
specific notification for a considerable period of time, and sometimes never. Therefore, the
uncertainty resulting from implementing an agreement with provisions violative of Article
85(1) will not be avoided just by notifying the agreement for the purpose of obtaining an
exemption, cf. Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin and Janssen, CoJ of Feb. 6, 1973, Case 48/72,
[1973] E.C.R. 77; C.M.R. 8170. There the Court held that so long as the Commission has not
decided whether to grant exemption to a notified agreement, the "agreement can be applied
only at the parties' risk and peril," id., at 8270-leaving civil liabilities of the contracting parties
in limbo until such time.
Recently, the Commission has emphasized, indirectly, the need for the pragmatic approach
in drafting EEC-related agreements which this author recommends. In its response to a
question put to it by a member of the European Parliament regarding provisional validity of
notified agreements the Commission stated, inter alia: "One of the unalterable principles of
Article 85 is that agreements which have the features described in paragraph 1 are prohibited
under that provision and are void pursuant to paragraph 2, unless they are exempted from such
prohibition, which in turn is possible only under the conditions set out in paragraph 3."
Commission Answer to Written Question No. 291/82, O.J. No. C 221, August 25, 1982, p. 9;
C.M.R.. 10,422.
23. See supra note 9.
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The following attempts to draw the dividing line between agreements
raising no concern under applicable EEC law and those which, in order to be
enforceable, will have to be submitted to the Commission to pass the
balancing test of pro- and anticompetitive effects under Article 85(3). By
way of example, the area of distribution will be discussed as the Commission
has recently promulgated its two new block exemptions in this field. The
dividing line separates permissible contract clauses, gathered empirically
from "impermissible" ones, i.e., provisions restricting competition that
require specific exemption from the Commission before they can be en-
forced in a court of law. However, agreements of minor importance, i.e.,
those that do not exert an appreciable effect on competition, will not be
discussed. The de minimis exception attaching to those agreements would
blanket even the most blatant violations of Article 85(1) otherwise subject
to heavy fines, such as absolute territorial protection resulting from outright
export prohibitions within the EEC.24
II. Distributing Goods under EEC Law
A. GENERAL
1. Application of Article 85(1)
The decision of how to organize the distribution of products in the EEC is
left entirely to the manufacturer of the goods in question. In particular, the
choice between a fully integrated system of parent and subsidiary companies
and/or branch offices and the use of independent wholesalers/distributors
selling for the manufacturer in the various member states of the Community
is not dictated by any law, but solely by business considerations. EEC law,
particularly Article 85, does not establish an obligation to supply products to
other independent companies that may wish to distribute them,26 save for
the somewhat extraordinary situations of remedying an organized boycott
among manufacturers or a dominant company's refusal to continue to
supply dependent customers. 27
24. See V61ck v. Vervaecke, CoJ of July 9, 1969, Case 5/69, 15 Rec. 295 [1969], C.M.R.
8074, at p. 8086. Also, Cadillon v. H6ss, CoJ of May 6, 1971, Case 1/71, 17 Rec. 351 [1971],
C.M.R. 8135. See in addition supra note 8.
25. The Common Customs Tariff of the EEC may make it advantageous for a United States
manufacturer to set up subsidiaries within the Common Market. Such subsidiaries would be
considered "national" companies of the member state of incorporation; cf. Article 58, EEC
Treaty. No further customs duties would therefore have to be paid on sales made by these
subsidiaries anywhere in the EEC.
26. See Demo-Studio Schmidt v. Commission, CoJ of October 11, 1983, Case 210/81, [1983]
E.C.R. 3045, 3063, C.M.R. 14,009. See also Comp. Rep. 1981, point 11.
27. See Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v. Commission, CoJ of
November 26, 1975, Case 73/74, [1975] E.C.R. 1491, C.M.R. 8335, re boycott; and United
Brands Co. v. Commission, CoJ of February 14, 1978, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, C.M.R.
1 8429, at p. 7714, re dominant firm.
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a. Use of Dealers Distributors
The Common Market's competition rules come into play, however, if a
distribution system is set up using dealers/distributors in EEC member
states. In legal terms, a dealer/distributor is an independent trader, or
enterprise, and therefore acts in his own name and on his own account when
entering into a distribution agreement with a manufacturer or someone
acting on the manufacturer's behalf. Consequently, one of the basic require-
ments for applying Article 85(1) is always present in a manufacturer/distrib-





It follows that the application of Article 85 is excluded and problems of
EEC competition law can altogether be avoided-leaving aside issues aris-
ing out of a possible position of market dominance and the abuse thereof by
the dominant firm-if a manufacturer organizes his European distribution
without resorting to distributors. In other words, sales in the Common
Market through branch offices or subsidiaries are not subject to Article
85(1) irrespective of the conditions of sale agreed upon. 2 9 EEC law does not
recognize the theory of intra-corporate conspiracy formerly approved by
American courts.
30
28. Instead of "enterprise," EEC law uses the awkward English translation "undertaking"
for the French and German terms "entreprise" and "Unternehmen," respectively, which are
contained in the original Treaty texts. Despite the official term "undertaking" which readers
will thus find in the decisions of the Commission and the CoJ, this author has taken the liberty of
using the more customary translation "enterprise" throughout this article except, of course, in
direct citations.
29. Centrafarm et al. v. Sterling Drug Inc., CoJ of October 31, 1974, Case 15/74, [1974]
E.C.R. 1147, C.M.R. 8246, where the Court held as follows: "In any event, Article 85 is not
concerned with agreements or concerted practices between undertakings belonging to the same
concern as parent company and subsidiary, if the undertakings form an economic unit within
which the subsidiary has no real freedom to determine its course of action on the market,and if
the agreements or practices are concerned merely with the internal allocation of tasks as
between the undertakings." Id., at pp. 9151 - 57/58. See also the earlier judgment in Grundig,
Consten where the CoJ held that "the prohibition of Article 85 ... does not apply to a situation
in which a single undertaking has integrated its distribution network into its own operations".
Id., note 16, at p.7651. The Commission, in earlier decisions, has held that parent and
subsidiary companies are one economic entity and that the division of markets among them is
only a division of labor; allocating separate national markets among various subsidiaries of the
same parent company was therefore not caught by Article 85(1), nor was the sale by such
subsidiaries on identical terms and conditions or for prices jointly agreed to, cf. Commission
Decisions of June 18, 1969, in the matter of Christiani & Nielsen, O.J. No. L 165, p.12 , of July
5, 1969, C.M.R. 9308, and of June 30, 1970, in the matter of Eastman Kodak, O.J. No.L 147,
p.24, of July 7, 1970, C.M.R. 9378. Consequently, a notification to the commission is not
necessary in these circumstances.
30. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). See also Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld
Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 3109 (1983). However, the theory's
validity has come abruptly to an end by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S.Ct. 2731 (1984).
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b. Affect on Trade Between Member States
The second basic requirement for the application of Article 85(1), and
EEC competition law in general, is also present in almost all manufacturer/
distributor arrangements relating to the Common Market. This require-
ment is of a jurisdictional character, making EEC law applicable to those
agreements "which may affect trade between member states." Without such
effect distortions of competition resulting from distribution agreements
could only be subject to national competition law of the member state in
question. However, the "effect on member state trade" requirement is
easily satisfied and restrictive, anticompetitive provisions in a distribution
agreement are thus removed from the Commission's jurisdiction only in
exceptional circumstances. 3 1 An example is an agreement between a manu-
facturer from a country outside the Common Market and an exclusive
distributor in a single EEC member state, provided that this agreement does
not appreciably interfere with the pattern of trade between member states
with respect to the specific product subject to the agreement. 32
i. Non-member State. On the other hand, the application of EEC law is
not precluded where a manufacturer from a non-member state, such as the
United States, sells its products directly to its customers in various EEC
countries, using one or two common ports of entry into the Community. In
United Brands v. Commission, the CoJ rejected the argument that such a
distribution system has no effect on intra-EEC trade on the basis that the
products in question were merely transiting the Common Market countries
prior to reaching their final destination. Since the products were not other-
wise available to the plaintiff distributor anywhere in the EEC and products
31. As a rule of thumb the requirement will be satisfied whenever trade between member
states develops in a different fashion than it would have done without the restriction resulting
from the agreement under consideration. Therefore it is no defense, if trade between two EEC
countries in the products subject to the restrictive agreement has increased, cf. Grundig,
Consten (supra note 16), at 7652. Equally, a purely domestic arrangement between manufac-
turer and distributors from the same EEC country can exert the described effect, since the
ability of traders from other member states to penetrate the market in the country in question
may be restricted by the agreement, cf. Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v. Commission,
CoJ of October 17, 1972, Case 8/72,18 Rec. 997 [1972], C.M.R. 8179, at pp. 8412/3. Finally, it
is not necessary that the effect on member state trade has already occurred. It is sufficient, if the
agreement is capable of exerting such influence in the future, cf. Miller International Schallplat-
ten GmbH v. Commission, CoJ of February 1, 1978, Case 19/77, [1978] E.C.R. 131, C.M.R.
8439, at p. 7926.
32. See Tepea B.V. v. Commission, CoJ of June 20, 1978, Case 28/77, [1978] E.C.R. 1391,
C.M.R. 8467, at p. 8430. Here the Court ruled as follows: "So long as the United Kingdom
was not a Member State, the restrictions on competition arising out of the implementation of
the Watts/Theal agreements in fact affected trade only within the Netherlands, and nothing in
the Court's file justifies the assertion that the partitioning of this domestic market appreciably
interfered with the pattern of trade between Member States in Watts products before January
1, 1973, the date of the United Kingdom's accession to the Common Market."
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of a different brand had to be obtained through imports, the Court ruled
that intra-Community trade was affected and that EEC competition law
applied.33
ii. Standard Form Agreements. Distribution is often accomplished
through networks of distributors dealing with the manufacturer on stan-
dardized terms. Particularly in larger geographic markets such systems
provide manufacturers with the opportunity to streamline the sale and
attendant services of their products. The resulting cost savings are usually
appreciable, and in a multi-nation market such as the EEC with its divergent
market conditions even more significant. One of the key tools employed to
maximize the efficiency, hence cost cutting nature of such distribution
systems is the use of a standard form agreement which all distributors have
to sign, if they want to participate in the distribution network. Strictly
speaking, every contract between a manufacturer and a distributor in such a
network is, or could be an agreement in restriction of competition and may
thus have to be notified to the Commission for an exemption. However, it is
not necessary under existing EEC law to notify every single agreement if an
underlying standard form agreement has been, or will be notified for exemp-
tion, provided the content of the individual agreements with distributors is
identical to the standard form contract. The CoJ has held in Brasserie de
Haecht v. Wilkin-Janssen that a duly made registration of such standard
form agreements is equivalent to notification of all agreements of same
content, even those concluded prior to the notification of the standard
one: 34
Networks of distribution agreements typically involve large numbers of
dealers, but nevertheless do not always permit everyone willing to sell the
products in question to participate. The exclusion of certain dealers from the
network is normally based on provisions contained in the standard form
agreement or, expressed differently, the selection of those permitted to
participate is justified through application of certain criteria laid down by
the manufacturer. Such a method of distribution is referred to as selective
distribution, and it will be discussed following these introductory remarks.
iii. Selective and Exclusive Mixture. Often distributors enjoy some pro-
tection for a given territory and thus, selective distribution systems may
contain elements of exclusive distribution, despite the large number of
dealers involved. This mixture of selective and exclusive distribution
methods is widely used in the Common Market, sometimes separating in
that way the retail and wholesale sides of the trade. The Commission has
addressed the legal issues relating to such mixed systems in several deci-
33. United Brands, supra note 27, at p. 7715.
34. Supra note 22, at p. 8271.
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sions, approving of the concept.35 Jurisdiction under EEC law almost always
exists and then, no matter where the individual dealer may be located in the
EEC, the competition rules of the Treaty apply directly and equally to all
distribution agreements. As a matter of law these rules are valid in all
member states ab initio, that is from the moment of accession to the
Community of the country in question.36
2. Competition- Unrelated
However, EEC law does not regulate the entire relationship between
manufacturer and distributors in the Common Market. It is mostly con-
cerned with the competition, or antitrust aspects of this relationship. Other
aspects, particularly the contractual obligations of the parties are governed
by the national law of the country in which the distributor has its main place
of business, unless the parties have changed this by including a choice of law
clause in their agreement. Details such as risk of loss, term and termination,
good will entitlement, etc. will have to be assessed under national law.
B. SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION
1. Commission Acceptance
For many years now the Commission has pursued a policy supportive of
distribution systems under which dealers are selected on the basis of their
specialized skills and certain other factors. Although such systems exclude
dealers who do not meet the selection criteria, the Commission consistently
allows the restriction of resale resulting from provisions stipulating that
"products may normally be resold . . . only by qualified personnel and in
premises offering satisfactory facilities for their storage, display, and sale."
This contract clause passed muster when the Commission reviewed the
distribution agreements in the matter of Eastman Kodak Corp. in 1970. 37
Since this early decision in EEC competition law practice the Commis-
sion's policy of permitting dealer selection on the basis of the dealer's
professional qualifications and standing, his staff, and the suitability of his
35. As examples cf. Commission Decisions of December 15, 1975, In the Matter of SABA,
O.J. No. L 28, p. 19, of February 3, 1976, C.M. R. 9802, renewed by decision of December 21,
1983, O.J. No. L376, p. 41, of December 31, 1983, C.M.R. 10,568; In the Matter ofJunghans,
Decision of December21, 1976, O.J. No. L30, p. 10, ofFebruary2, 1977, C.M.R. 9912; In the
Matter of Murat, Decision of December 5, 1983, O.J. No. L 348, p.20, of December 20, 1983,
C.M.R. T 10,544; and most recently In the Matter of IBM, Decision of April 18, 1984, O.J. No.
L 118, p. 2 4, of May 4, 1984, C.M.R. 10,585.
36. Metallurgiki Halyps AE v. Commission, CoJ of December 9, 1982, Case 258/81, [1982]
E.C.R. 4261, C.M.R. 8950, with respect to Greece as the Community's newest member state,
37. Supra note 29.
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premises has continued.38 This policy has been upheld by the CoJ in a
number of judgments.39
The justification for permitting only selected dealers to distribute a given
product in the EEC can be summarized, using the Commission's own words
from a recent public statement:" . . . such systems, particularly in relation
to technically advanced products, can ensure that distribution is carried out
by dealers possessing the specialized knowledge required to give advice and
perform customer and guarantee services." 40 Thus, the restriction inherent
in these systems is justified by the sales and after-sales services provided by
specialty retailers, which in turn is expected to result in benefits for consum-
ers and a better quality distribution system overall.
a. Manufacturer Selection Criteria
Whether or not the restriction that comes with any selective distribution
system represents at the same time a violation of Article 85(1) and therefore
requires notification of the standard form agreement to the Commission to
make for the enforceability of the individual agreements depends upon the
criteria established by the manufacturer to admit dealers to, or exclude them
from the system. The mere fact that it is a selective distribution system, and
not a "free for all" approach chosen by the manufacturer is not sufficient to
subject the system to Article 85 and its somewhat cumbersome ramifications
explained above. Expressed differently, EEC law does not, despite the
breadth of Article 85(1), prohibit a system of selective distribution in and of
itself. Rather, the application of Article 85 hinges upon the economic effects
of a particular agreement, or network of agreements, but not on its legal
nature or specific type.41
38. See decisions mentioned in supra note 35. An overview of the Commission's early
decision practice in this field and a useful comparison of EEC and U.S. antitrust rules relating to
distribution can be found in Salzman, Analogies Between United States and Common Market
Antitrust Law in the Field of Distribution, 13 INT'L LAW. 47 (1979).
39. MetroSB-Grossmirkte v. Commission, CoJ of October 25, 1977, Case 26/76, [1977]
E.C.R. 1875, C.M.R. 8435; Lancome v. Etos B.V., CoJ of July 10, 1980, case 99/79 [1980]
E.C.R. 2511, C.M.R. 8714; L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe AMCK, supra, note 13; Salonia v.
Poidomani, CoJ of June 16, 1981, Case 126/80, [1981] E.C.R. 1563, C.M.R. 8758; AEG-
Telefunken v. Commission, CoJ of October 25, 1983, Case 107/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3151.
40. Commission Answer to Written Question No. 669/83, O.J. No. C 335, p.3, of December
12, 1983, C.M.R. 10,546.
41. Lancome, supra note 39, at p. 8593/4. For this reason it is equally true that other
agreements belonging to a separate, distinguishable category like selective distribution agree-
ments are also not automatically subject to Article 85(1) in all cases, although they may contain
inherent exclusionary features. The best example is the category of exclusive licensing agree-
ments. In its now famous Maize Seed judgment the CoJ ruled that "the grant of an open
exclusive license, that is to say a license that does not affect the position of third parties such as
parallel importers and licensees for other territories, is not in itself incompatible with Article
85(1) of the Treaty." Nungesser et al. v. Commission, CoJ of June 8, 1982, Case 258/78, [19821
E.C.R. 2015, C.M.R. 8805 at p. 7544. All depends on the circumstances of each situation,
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b. Exclusion of the Unqualified
Implicit in the acceptance of selective distribution and the inherent
obligation of all participants in the system to sell for resale only within the
network, i.e., only to other appointed dealers, is the recognition that it does
not amount to a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article
85(1) where a manufacturer refuses to supply outsiders, i.e., dealers who do
not meet the requirements of the selective distribution agreement in ques-
tion. If a certain standard of professional training, technical knowledge, and
appearance of the trading premises can lawfully be required from reselling
contract partners as a necessary element of distributing the products con-
cerned, then it is permissible, by the same token, to exclude from the
distribution system those traders who do not meet the standards established
by the manufacturer. Such exclusion would not violate Article 85(1) and
hence, a notification to the Commission of the agreement(s) establishing
such standards is unnecessary. 42 Consequently, the excluded traders can-
not, in situations such as these, claim a right to be supplied with the
manufacturer's product, even if they are willing and able to purchase. The
Commission's decision, in the matter of Demo-Studio Schmidt supports this
analysis and the CoJ later confirmed that Article 85(1) is not a legal basis for
a general supply obligation on the part of manufacturers.43
2. Discrimination Potential
a. Parallel Imports
Notwithstanding the fact that Article 85 compatibility is measured by the
economic effects of an agreement, not its legal nature, selective distribution
as a method entails opportunities for discrimination in the application of the
system. Although perhaps economically neutral in a given case, these
opportunities raise concern under EEC competition law. By far the most
important concern, of which everyone entering into a distribution agree-
ment for the Common Market should be aware, is the issue of parallel
imports from other EEC countries. EEC-specific considerations categor-
ically demand the integrity of the Community-wide trading system, since the
Treaty of Rome was designed to bring about economic interpenetration
throughout the Community and to prevent the protection of national
i.e., the compatibility of a contract clause with Article 85 can usually be assessed by way of a
case-by-case review, only.
42. Nevertheless, a careful examination of the specific requirements demanded of traders in
the individual case is inevitable. If these requirements are not commensurate with the sale of
goods of the type in question, then it is likely that the restrictions surpass the threshold of
Article 85(1) and therefore require an exemption from the Commission in order to be enforce-
able. Readers are referred to the text below where, on the basis of previous decisions, a number
of restrictions are discussed that can be included with impunity in a selective distribution
agreement for the Common Market.
43. Supra note 26.
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markets. 44 Time and time again this overriding principle of EEC competi-
tion law has been confirmed and upheld in the decisions of the Commission
and the CoJ, 45 and it has never been seriously questioned by any informed
writer.
As a result, any selective distribution system that permits the manufac-
turer to refuse admission to qualified traders (wholesalers or retailers)
because of their involvement in parallel imports is illegal in the EEC and
stands no chance of being exempted. American businessmen and their
advisers must know that certain vertical restraints in distribution contracts,
namely those that would seal off a geographic market against parallel
imports or merely make it difficult, or more expensive, to engage in parallel
imports from other EEC countries, are clearly a "no-no" in Europe,
although such restraints may well be acceptable under prevailing U.S.
antitrust law. The economic analysis of the effects of such restraints must
(and will) be subjected to the superior objectives of market integration and
free movement of goods enshrined in the Treaty.46 To avoid any problems
with its anticipated distribution of products in the Common Market, a
manufacturer should therefore eliminate from his agreements any provision
that impinges on the unalterable rights of qualified resellers to engage in
parallel trade. This does not mean, however, that he cannot assign territor-
ially limited areas of responsibility to his resellers on the first level of
distribution. As will be shown later, such restrictions have been approved by
the Commission and the CoJ in the past.
3. Group Exemption
As of January 1985, a group exemption regulation exists in the Common
Market that specifically deals with the area of selective distribution. This is
Regulation No. 123/85 concerning the distribution of automobiles and spare
parts, including service therefor, within a defined territory of the Common
Market. 47 The regulation constitutes a sui generis approach to an area of
44. Salonia v. Poidomani, supra note 39, at p. 9100.
45. It is not possible to list all these decisions in a single footnote. One of the earliest
pronouncements of the principle is found in Italy v. EEC Council and Commission, supra note
7. A representative example for all CoJ judgments confirming this early ruling is the Court's
definition of the essential goal of the Treaty of Rome in 1971, as follows: ". . . the essential goal
of the Treaty . . . is to merge the national markets into a single market." Deutsche Gram-
mophon GmbH v. MetroSB-Grossmirkte, CoJ of June 8, 1971, Case 78/70,17 Rec. 487 [1971],
C.M.R. 8106, at p. 7 192. For further examples, including pertinent Commission decisions, see
the analysis of the entire EEC competition case law existing as of 1982, in TOEPKE, EEC
COMPETITION LAW, supra note 7, at chapters 41 through 75.
46. See Articles 2, 3(f), 30 and 36 in conjunction with Articles 85 and 86. In light of the
current disintegration of the Community over financial disputes among leading European
politicians, one could come to the conclusion that these articles of law are the only thing that
works in today's Community. They can be seen as the remaining linch-pin of the Common
Market's unity.
47. Regulation On The Application Of Article 85(3) Of The Treaty To Certain Categories
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specialized distribution, typically organized through a network of dealers
who have been selected according to a mixture of technical and economic,
not just qualitative criteria, thus creating so-called closed selective dis-
tribution systems. Admission depends on additional criteria/obligations,
resulting in the exclusion of otherwise qualified distributors meeting the
professional requirements for distributing the product in question. Such
agreements always represent a violation of Article 85(1) and therefore must
be notified and exempted.48 Inevitably, this leads to bureaucratic delay and
legal uncertainty regarding the enforceability of the agreements.
The Commission has decided to solve this problem by issuing the block
exemption to all agreements falling into this category, thus recognizing, in
principle, that selective distribution in the automobile industry is compati-
ble with Article 85(3). Regulation 123/85 follows the familiar format known
since Regulation 67/67 concerning exclusive distribution, infra, except it
contains the unusual feature of a blanket permission for use restrictions of a
certain kind. 49 The regulation will become effective on July 1, 1985, and
remains in force pursuant to its own terms for a period of ten years.
4. Commission Decisions
a. Defining the Threshold
The Commission decisions of the past and the confirming judgments of
the CoJ previously mentioned 50 have established that, in short, the
threshold of Article 85(1) will not be reached and thus, a notification of a
selective distribution agreement (system) can be dispensed with, if distribu-
tors/dealers are selected based only on objective criteria of a qualitative
nature relating to their skills, education, or technical experience (or that of
their staff), and the suitability of their trading premises, all in proportion to
the specific requirements for distributing the product(s) in question, and
provided that these selection criteria are uniformly applicable to all poten-
tial traders and are not in fact applied in a discriminatory fashion (so-called
open or "simple" selective distribution systems). Admission to such a sys-
tem merely depends on the individual dealer's fulfillment of qualitative
criteria objectively required to ensure an adequate distribution of the goods.
Of Motor Vehicle Distribution And Servicing Agreements, O.J. No. C 17, p. 4, of Jan. 18,
1985, C.M.R. 2751.
48. A good example is the case of SABA, supra, note 35. If in order to be admitted to the
network dealers must not only satisfy certain professional criteria but must also agree to sales
promotion, order and performance commitments, or if quantitative selection criteria are used,
the agreements constitute a restriction of competition in the meaning of Article 85(1). In
appropriate cases they can then be exempted pursuant to Article 85(3), as has now happened
twice in SABA; see supra note 35.
49. Article 3(4), Regulation 123/85 allows prohibiting the use of competitive spare parts by
the dealer in servicing the contract cars, provided such spare parts "do not match the quality of
contract goods."
50. Supra notes 35, 37 and 39.
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As an example, a manufacturer of watches or jewelry could therefore
insist, without having to notify his agreements to obtain an exemption, that
dealers who want to be admitted to his distribution system conduct a
business as a retail jeweler/watchmaker, either from a specialty shop or
within a self-contained specialist department in a larger department store,
where they sell exclusively jewelry, clocks and watches, and other luxury
articles related to this trade; he can further require that dealers possess the
necessary professional knowledge, evidenced by appropriate means such as
a certificate from a relevant educational institution, and that they employ
appropriately qualified full-time staff. 51
In addition, other obligations may be imposed on retailers under certain
circumstances without crossing the threshold of Article 85(1), thus avoiding
the need to notify the agreement. An example are stocking and sales
promotion requirements. The agreement, however, must not contain any
further obligations on the dealer in these cases, such as minimum sales or
specified delivery quantities. 5
2
b. Sample Non-restrictive Provisions
An analysis of previously decided cases involving the distribution of
products in the EEC reveals several such contract provisions that have been
held to fall outside the prohibition contained in Article 85(1). A list of the
more typical and frequent of these non-restrictive provisions is assembled
below, to show the difference between a selective distribution agreement
that is compatible with currently existing EEC law, and one that has to be
exempted in order to be enforceable, thus requiring a notification of such
agreement. Readers will be able to evaluate their own distribution agree-
ments by checking them against this list. Any contract containing only
provisions of the kind listed below, and devoid of further obligations on the
reselling dealers, is in all likelihood a valid agreement under EEC compe-
tition law and does not have to be notified to the Commission.
53
51. These requirements were all held to fall outside the prohibition of Article 85(i) by the
Commission in its Junghans and Murat decisions, supra note 35.
52. A manufacturer complying with these prerequisites can require that his dealers maintain
adequate stocks in all current products covered by the contract and that they provide adequate
customer advice and service. Cf. Commission Decision of April 17, 1980, O.J. No. L 120, p. 26,
of May 13, 1980, C.M.R. 10,223, In the Matter of Krups.
53. Problems may arise where a combination of factors usually not present at the same time
results in a different conclusion as to the restriction of competition in the individual case. See the
remarks in text relating to the Krups decision, supra. Also, increased use of the method of
selective distribution in a given sector of the economy may change results; cf. MetroSB-
Grossmarkte v. Commission, supra note 39, where the Court cautioned that alteration of
competitive market conditions as a result of an increase in selective distribution networks may
necessitate a different assessment of an agreement's exemptability. While this comment
obviously relates to the assessment of an agreement by the Commission under Article 85(3) it is
conceivable that certain contract provisions, normally outside Article 85(1), may have to be
assessed differently, as well, in such circumstances.
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Professional Competence
Traders at all levels of distribution can be required to satisfy a standard of
professional training and technical knowledge reasonably necessary for an ade-
quate, competent distribution of the contract goods. Dealers can be asked to
employ equally qualified staff on a full-time basis. The measure for a dealer's
qualification is his ability to provide sufficient customer advice in selling the
product in question and his after-sales service capability, measured by the techni-
cal complexity of the product.
54
Status of Trading Premises
The internal fitting and external appearance of the dealer's shop must be
suitable for the sale of the contract goods. This permits manufacturers to require
their retailers to maintain premises used exclusively for trading in the subject
goods, 55 or, in the case of large department stores, to maintain specialty depart-
ments, with no adjacent departments selling products that would detrimentally
affect the sale of the contract goods. Manufacturers can also insist that retailers do
not mix the contract goods with other products of similar appearance, but dif-
ferent quality. Retailers can be required to keep their shop open to the public




Provided that it does not affect the opportunities for sale of third parties, such as
distributors for other territories and parallel importers, manufacturers may under-
take to restrict their sales in a particular geographic area to one dealer.5 7 The
reverse obligation imposed on retailers and/or wholesalers to refrain from buying
and selling competing products is, however, a violation of Article 85(1) and stands
little chance of being exempted by the Commission in a selective distribution
system. 58 It is, however, automatically exempt under Regulation 1983/83 pro-
vided an exclusive sales area is carefully defined. In this case, the selective
distribution network changes to a system of many parallel exclusive distribu-
torships.
Outside the contract territory a prohibition of advertising, or canvassing in
other ways for customers, a prohibition of establishing branch offices and of
maintaining sales depots, all with respect to the contract goods, can be imposed on
dealers with defined, exclusive sales areas. Any of these clauses may be included in
54. IBM, supra 35, provides a good example of this.
55. In Murat supra note 35, the Commission allowed this requirement of exclusivity with
respect to the trading premises, but in SABA, supra note 35, retailers were only required to run
a specialist retail business which achieves over 50% of its turnover from sales of consumer
electronic equipment (the contract goods in question in that case). The author does not know
whether the difference in volume percentage is the result of the Commission's intervention, or
merely a difference in sales policy of the manufacturers involved in these two cases.
56. This was the issue decided in Demo-Studio Schmidt, supra note 26.
57. Nungesser et al. v. Commission, supra note 41.
58. Cf. Commission Decision of December 21, 1977, In the Matter of Liebig, O.J. No. L53,
p. 20, of February 24, 1978, C.M.R. 10,017. In Liebig the Commission declared the non-
competition clause contained in the spice manufacturer's distribution contracts illegal under
EEC competition law, and refused an exemption. No particular sales area had been defined as
the exclusive territory for the distributors. In contrast see Commission Decision of December
13, 1974, In the Matter of B.M.W., O.J. No. L 29, p. 1, of February 3, 1975, C.M.R. 9701. Of
course, if the specific requirements of Regulation 1984/83 are observed, a block exemption may
exist for exclusive purchasing obligations.
WINTER 1985
136 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
distribution agreements without creating a need to notify, since they benefit from
the group exemption in Regulation 1983/83. However, dealers may not be pre-
vented from selling outside their contract territory, except for sales to dealers who
do not meet the criteria of professional competence applicable in the particular
case.
Manufacturers may reserve the right to alter the dealer's exclusive territory
unilaterally, and the agreement may also provide for manufacturers to install
further dealers in the contract territory at their discretion. 59 The permissibility of
both these provisions depends, however, on manufacturers refraining from rec-
ommending against selling competitive products or maintaining/recommending
resale prices. The alteration of the dealer's contract territory may not be a reprisal
for competitive behavior by the distributor.
60
Sales Promotion and Marketing
Dealers may be required to avail themselves of the promotional aids and
advertising material supplied by the manufacturer, to display the contract goods to
their advantage, to keep all stocks in good condition, and to maintain a favorable
and reputable appearance of their shop in accordance with the prestige and brand
image of the products in question. Dealers can be asked to undertake intensive
sales promotion for the contract goods, if this does not prevent them from taking
advantage of competition between different brands and if they are not obliged to
achieve a specified turnover or to take delivery of specified quantities at specified
61times.
Dealers may further be required to use the manufacturer's trademarks, to
follow instructions issued by the manufacturer regarding their advertising, except
as to prices, and to supply contract goods only in their original packaging.62 They
may also be asked to serve and advise customers in a competent manner with
respect to the contract goods, except that Article 85(1) will be violated where the
sales and/or promotional efforts required of dealers restrict their competitive
behavior by eliminating too much of their freedom to pursue sales of competing
brands. Then, the agreement requires an exemption.
Provisions dealing with the administration of the distribution system, such as
the method of order placing and price quotations, the conditions of payment,
customer complaints etc., are normally without problem, do not require an
exemption, and hence no notification.
63
Stocking Requirements
A requirement to keep adequate stocks of all current products of the manufac-
turer is in accordance with the natural function of wholesalers to supply the retail
trade and raises no problems under Article 85(1). As long as the manufacturer's
product line is not exceptionally broad, the products are small and cheap, and do
59. These provisions were held to fall outside the prohibition of Article 85(1) in the BM. W.
decision, supra.
60. This comment addresses the actual operation of a selective distribution system and has
little to do with the way in which the agreement between manufacturer and distributor is
written. Readers should be warned that Article 85(1) cannot only be infringed by drafting a
contract, but also by implementing an otherwise legal contract in a discriminatory, repressive
fashion. The AEG-Telefunken case, supra note 39, is a perfect illustration.
61. Krups, supra note 52. However, the obligation to undertake intensive sales promotion
usually is beyond the threshold of Article 85(1).
62. B.M.W., supra note 58; Commission Decision of June 14, 1973, In the Matter of DuPont
de Nemours, O.J. No. L 194, p. 27, of July 16, 1973, C.M.R. 9578.
63. DuPont de Nemours, supra note 62.
VOL. 19, NO. I
EEC LAW OF COMPETITION 137
not tie up substantial finances or storage space, such an obligation is also accept-
able in agreements with retailers.64 Otherwise retailers can be required to keep
sufficient stocks at least of a representative range of the manufacturer's products,
to be able to supply customers promptly. An obligation imposed on retailers to
take at least 3 month's supplies each time they order is permissible, if this
minimum order quantity represents less than the customary average order quanti-
ty in the trade.6
5
After-Sales Services
It is a permissible obligation that dealers provide the customer with the usual
service of the branch. Distribution agreements may require retailers to give
competent after-sales service, either themselves or through qualified third parties
whose workmanship they can control. Where this is not possible, they can be
asked to return the products to the manufacturer for service.
The agreement can impose an obligation upon dealers to provide a six month
warranty with respect to the contract goods and dealers can be required to perform
the warranty repair services. A refusal to provide such free-of-charge warranty
services may be based upon the following three reasons: (i) the product is defec-
tive by reason of faulty installation and/or use inconsistent with national safety
standards; (ii) the product has been used in violation of the manufacturer's
instructions and has therefore been damaged; (iii) adjustments or changes have
been made to the product other than properly executed adjustments required to
make the product conform to technical/safety standards in the country of use. 66
The distribution agreement may contain these provisions and dealers may be
authorized by the agreement to include these refusal-of-warranty provisions in
their conditions of sale, without a need to notify the distribution agreement.
Resale Restrictions
The contract may contain a requirement that products shall be resold at all
subsequent stages of trade only by qualified personnel and in premises offering
satisfactory facilities for their storage, display, and sale. Dealers can be prohibited
from selling for resale to dealers who are not appointed to the distribution system
or who do not meet the criteria for appointment. 67 Equally, the agreement may
impose an obligation on the manufacturer to supply only appointed dealers or
dealers who meet the requirements for adequate distribution of the products in
question. However, for these obligations to be below the threshold of Article
85(1), it is necessary for the distribution system to be an open system, meaning that
all dealers who fulfill the qualitative criteria of admission will be admitted without
a need to undertake further obligations.
64. Krups, supra note 52.
65. Murat, supra note 35. However, an agreement by retailers to order and sell regularly, to
carry the full range of the manufacturer's products, as well as stipulations to annual sales targets
by wholesalers or retailers (general or product-specific) are not outside Article 85(1) but
require an exemption from the Commission; cf. SABA, supra note 35.
66. Commission Decision of October 23, 1978, In the Matter of Zanussi, O.J. No. L 322,
p. 36, of November 16, 1978, C.M.R. 10,090.
67. Cf. IBM and Murat, supra note 35. In Murat the Commission insisted upon the change of
language in the agreement reflected in the phrase "who do not meet the criteria for appoint-
ment." Prior approval of a dealer by the manufacturer as condition of selling to this other dealer
is thus no longer required. In older decisions of previous years the flat denial of supplies to
unauthorized dealers had been tolerated, cf. the first SABA decision of 1975, supra note 35.




Wholesalers may be prohibited from supplying the contract goods to private
consumers. 68 This follows from the separation of functions of the wholesale and
retail trade. The inherent differences in the cost of doing business would, if not
taken into account by allowing a prohibition on wholesalers to sell to end-users,
result in an unfair competitive advantage for wholesalers over retailers.
Export Prohibitions Outside EEC
All dealers may be prohibited from exporting to countries outside the Common
Market, in principle. 69 However, where the EEC has concluded a free-trade
agreement with a specific non-member state, such an export restriction would
appreciably affect competition and would thus no longer be permissible with
respect to such country. The reason is the absence of any customs duties as a result
of the free-trade agreement and therefore, the possibility of reimport of the
contract goods into the EEC, thus making them part of the normal competitive
process.
Sales Information and Verification
Obligations to supply information on their trading position, available stocks and
expected demand can be imposed on dealers. Also, dealers may be required to
inform the manufacturer about sales trends and the economic situation in their
market, to exchange opinions, offer suggestions and make critical reports, all in
relation to the contract goods. Further, dealers with exclusive sales territories
allotted to them can be required to inform their principal of their gross income
from the sale of the contract goods, as well as any discounts granted to
customers. 70 This is not considered a restriction of competition, and does not
require notification of the agreement, as long as the principal refrains from
recommending against selling outside the exclusive territory, selling at certain
prices or as long as no advantages are offered or disadvantages threatened in
respect of any business conduct by the dealers.
Since every selective distribution system entails, by definition, to sell for resale
only to appointed dealers, manufacturers have the right to discover when and to
whom the contract goods have been sold by the dealer. They also have the right to
verify this information and the corresponding obligation for dealers toRermit
verification of their compliance is below the threshold of Article 85(1). Such
verification rights of suppliers can be included in distribution agreements with
impunity.
Term and Termination
Agreements can be concluded for a fixed period, such as a one-year term, and
they may be made renewable by a tacit agreement. Termination rights for the
manufacturer for breaches of the retailer's obligations do not constitute a restric-
tion of competition in the sense of Article 85(1). 7 2
Miscellaneous Provisions
Contract clauses which deal with the retention of legal title to the contract goods
until full payment, with consignments, settlement of disputes by arbitration, with
choice of law or with forum selection are all acceptable without any need to notify
such a provision.
68. SABA, supra note 35. However, this prohibition may never be imposed on retailers.
69. Junghans, supra note 35.
70. SABA and Junghans, id.
71. Junghans, id.
72. B.M.W., supra note 58.
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5. Specialist Trade Agreements
Although recognized as the cause for potential price rigidities and thus as
being partially detrimental to consumers in the limited sense that it may
result in a decrease of price competition for certain brand image consumer
goods, selective distribution has been confirmed and reconfirmed as a
legitimate method of distribution in the Common Market. Price competi-
tion is not regarded as the only form of competition worthy of protection
under EEC law and certainly does not have absolute priority in all cases.
The specialist trade made possible through selective distribution networks is
a preferred European approach to distribution, and manufacturers from the
United States can organize the sale of their products in the Common Market
accordingly. This includes a multi-level distribution system separating the
functions of wholesaler and retailer, and preventing competition between
the two. Article 85(1) does not stand in the way of agreements written to
achieve such specialist trade. Such agreements do not require an exemption
and hence, do not have to be notified as long as the individual contract
provisions stay within the limits outlined in the above list. The April 1984
decision re IBM may serve as the latest precedent for a selective distribution
system compatible with Article 85(1).7
In every case the specific product characteristics of the contract goods
must be considered, and the obligations imposed on dealers must be necessi-
tated by such product characteristics to preserve the image and/or quality
and to ensure proper and safe use of the products by consumers. 73a In case of
a dispute the ultimate question whether or not Article 85(1) applies to a
specific provision in the agreement, must be decided by the national court
hearing the case.
Readers should be alerted once again, however, that EEC compatibility
of a selective distribution system depends not only on the drafting of the
standard form agreement used by the manufacturer, but also on the way
such system is operated in day-to-day business. The AEG-Telefunken deci-
sions by the Commission and the CoJ, respectively, prove the point. A $1
million fine imposed by the Commission on the German hi-fi and consumer
electronics manufacturer in its 1982 decision was upheld by the Court, since
the abusive manner in which the system was implemented by the company
caused appreciable restrictions of competition. 7 Distribution agreements,
although inoffensive to start with, may nevertheless run afoul of Article
73. Supra, note 35.
73a. See Commission Decision of Dec. 10, 1984, in the Matter of Grohe, O.J. No. L 19,
p. 17, of Jan. 23, 1985, C.M.R. § 10,661.
74. See AEG-Telefunken v. Commission, supra note 39. Similarly, the CoJ has recently
ruled again that "the existence of a concerted practice aimed at restricting parallel
imports ... is sufficient to exclude block exemption under Regulation No. 67/67/EEC."
Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. v. Commission, CoJ of February 21, 1984, Case 86/82, [1984] E.C.R.
-, C.M.R. 14, 014, at 14,187.
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85(1) and attract fines, if appropriate surveillance is lacking and admission
to the distribution network is refused, rendered difficult, or made subject to
additional conditions for those dealers whose selling practices, particularly
pricing practices, threaten the manufacturer's own pricing policy, as was the
case in AEG-Telefunken. This confirms that the criteria for selecting dealers
must not only be restricted to qualitative, objective aspects in order to
conform with Article 85(1), but must also be applied consistently and in a
non-discriminatory fashion.
6. Summary
In summary, dealers in a selective distribution system must be free to sell
throughout the Common Market-with limited restrictions permitted on
wholesalers and their sales to end-users, and on retailers in an open system
with respect to their sales to other authorized dealers. Dealers must also be
free to establish their own prices, resulting in an absolute ban on resale price
maintenance by manufacturers. 75 Recommended prices appear to be less of
a problem nowadays, at least where they lack any binding effect, 76 but they
have been held by the CoJ in at least one judgment to amount to illegal price
fixing. 7 7 Finally, dealers in a selective distribution system must always be
free to sell competing products. The use of noncompetition clauses in a
distribution agreement, which the manufacturer does not want to notify to
the Commission for exemption, is reserved for exclusive dealing arrange-
ments. These will be discussed next.
C. EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION
1. Favorable Treatment
For the past seventeen years, exclusive distribution agreements have
received preferential treatment in the Common Market. Since 1967 a group
exemption regulation has existed whereby agreements are exempted as a
category from the competition rules of the EEC Treaty, provided only two
companies are party to the agreement and one party agrees with the other to
supply certain goods for resale within the EEC only to that other party.
7 8
As a result it has not been necessary to notify exclusive dealing arrange-
ments in the Common Market for a long time, provided the agreement did
not exceed the scope of Regulation 67/67 in the individual case. In contrast
75. Commission Decision of December 22, 1976, in the matter of Gerofabriek, O.J. No. L
16, p. 8, of January 19, 1977, C.M.R. 9914. See also, DuPont de Nemours, supra note 62.
76. Cf. Murat supra note 35, where the Commission tolerated some recommended prices
contained in the manufacturer's annual catalogues, pointing at the same time, however, to the
fact that these prices were "not in any way binding and quite large differences can in fact be
found in the prices charged even by retailers quite close together." °ld., at 11,260.
77. Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v. Commission, supra note 31.
78. Regulation 67/67, O.J. No. L 57, p. 849, of March 25, 1967, C.M.R. 2727.
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to many other agreements relating to business in the Common Market,
notably certain selective distribution agreements, the contracts concluded
by manufacturers with their exclusive distributors in the EEC have benefit-
ted from a blanket approval, without bureaucratic delay, and the companies
involved have enjoyed legal certainty as to the enforceability of their con-
tracts. Recently, this policy of favorable treatment of exclusive dealing was
reconfirmed when the Commission issued two new regulations replacing the
1967 regulation, thus continuing the group or block exemption of exclusive
distribution and exclusive purchasing under certain defined conditions. 79
2. Reasons
There are a number of valid reasons for this administrative favoritism
towards exclusive dealing. First and foremost is the recognition that exclu-
sivity arrangements between manufacturers and their dealers, as a category,
result in economic and social benefits that almost always outweigh the
restriction of competition inherent in agreements that oblige a manufacturer
to sell only to one dealer per defined territory. The redeeming features of
exclusive dealing usually compensate for the limitation of sales outlets, i.e.,
the threat to intrabrand competition that consumers have to put up with
following the institution of a single, exclusive dealer for the given product in
their respective territory.
In such a system, manufacturers have the ability to streamline their sales
activities and to overcome more easily distribution difficulties in interna-
tional trade, such as linguistic, legal, and other barriers. In addition, a
multitude of rationalization effects result from exclusive dealing both on the
part of manufacturers and distributors. As an example, exclusive dealers
will concentrate their sales efforts on the contract goods within their terri-
tory, thus boosting sales and cutting cost per unit sold. This leads to lower
prices and therefore, interbrand competition will become stiffer, offering
consumers better choices. Also, the availability of the product in question
will be improved in exclusive dealing situations, again benefiting consumers,
since the continuity of supplies is usually guaranteed in such a system by the
manufacturer.
3. Categorical Exemption
Consequently, these agreements often satisfy the conditions of Article
85(3) making them eligible for exemption.80 The Commission has seen fit,
understandably, to grant them exemption by category, since this relieves
79. Regulation 1983/83, O.J. No. L 173, p. 1, of June 30, 1983; and Regulation 1984/83, O.J.
No. L 173, p. 5, of June 30, 1983; C.M.R. 2730 and 2733, respectively.
80. See supra note 12. The Commission itself has stated that its "approach to exclusive
dealing agreements is largely favourable." See, Comp. Rep. 1980, point 2.
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tremendously the administrative burden of single case exemptions. During
the first years of applying the EEC competition rules and after the adoption
of Regulation 17/62, which introduced the requirement of, and the adminis-
trative rules for notification of agreements in 1962, the Commission was
swamped with thousands of applications for exemption by companies seek-
ing to escape the rigidity of Article 85(1).
As a result of adopting Regulation 67/67, the Commission's workload
with respect to exclusive distribution agreements decreased dramatically.
Of 29,500 such agreements notified to the Commission during the early
years of application of Article 85, approximately 25,000 notifications were
resolved automatically on the basis of the group exemption regulation. 81
There is no doubt that the Commission will continue to pursue its policy of
support for exclusive distribution agreements in the Common Market, at the
same time, however, watching over attempts to partition national markets
through the use of such agreements.8 a The EEC competition rules in favor
of exclusive dealing have maintained their validity since they were placed on
the books of EEC law in 1967. These rules, in their renewed and amended
form of 1983 will remain in force for a period of at least 15 years, pursuant to
specific provisions in the new Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83.
The conditions under which Regulation 67/67 was applicable are widely
known, as are the exceptions to its applicability.83 It is therefore of greater
81. Comp. Rep. 1979, point 2.
82. Neither Regulation 67/67 nor the new regulations of 1983 tolerate such attempts as they
would stifle the indisputable improvements otherwise gained from exclusive dealing in intra-
EEC trade. Cf. Recital No. 11 ("Whereas" clause) to Regulation 1983/83, and Commission
Information Memo No. P-60 of June 1983, C.M.R. 10,496, issued when the new regulation
was adopted. The Commission announced in the Press Statement that the regulation "reflects
the increased concern on the part of the Commission to give consumers and intermediaries or
agents a real guarantee that they can obtain goods sold in the Community wherever they are
offered on the best terms, or, in other words, to guarantee the possibility of parallel imports,
which is an indispensable condition of any absolute territorial concession." See also the recent
case Wooden Racing Kayaks, Comp. Rep. 1982, point 80.
83. Generally speaking, Article 1 of the regulation, as amended, declared Article 85(1)
inapplicable to bilateral agreements that stipulate, for purposes of resale, exclusive supply
and/or purchase obligations. Article 2, Regulation 67/67, listed additional obligations that
could be imposed in such agreements without losing the benefit of the block exemption granted
by Article 1, such as non-compete clauses, obligations to refrain from pursuing sales activities
outside the allotted territory, minimum purchase requirements, and complete product line
obligations. Article 3, Regulation 67/67 contained certain exceptions to the applicability of
Article 1, i.e., removed the benefit of the block exemption, where competing manufacturers
had entered into a reciprocal exclusive dealing arrangement or where the parties took measures
to obstruct parallel imports of the contract goods from other EEC countries.
Further limitations of the regulation's applicability resulted from interpretations of its
provisions by the Commission and the CoJ in pertinent decisions. The most noteworthy of these
limitations is probably the Commission's ruling in its Decision of December 19, 1974, in the
matter of Duro-Dyne/Europair, O.J. No. L 29, p. 11, of February 3, 1975, C.M.R. 9708A.
Here, the Commission held that Regulation 67/67 did not apply to an agreement granting
exclusivity for the whole of the Common Market as this was beyond the language contained in
Article 1: agreements "for resale within a defined area of the Common Market" (emphasis
added).
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interest to analyze the new state of the law in the area of exclusive dealing
introduced with the block exemption regulations of 1983, in order to com-
pare the situation today with that which existed in the EEC prior to adoption
of these new regulations. The following comments are designed to accom-
plish this comparison, by highlighting any differences in applicability of the
regulations in their new form. This will provide readers with the means to
assess for themselves whether their exclusive distribution contracts are
covered by the new regulations and thus exempt from notification, or
whether they have to be notified to the Commission to obtain an exemption
from Article 85(1) in order to be enforceable.8 4
Il. The New Regulations: Exemptions
A. GENERAL
Generally speaking, Regulation 1983/83 (the exclusive distribution ex-
emption) contains the old rules of the 1967 regulation, while Regulation
1984/83 introduces new, special provisions aimed at the particular situation
existing for a manufacturer who does not allocate an area of sales responsi-
bility to his dealer, notwithstanding the dealer's obligation to take all his
supplies from that manufacturer (the exclusive purchasing exemption).85
Both regulations became effective on July 1, 1983, and they shall expire at
year-end 1997. In view of the changes introduced with the 1983 law, com-
panies are given a period of three and one-half years to adjust their exclusiv-
ity contracts, if required. This applies to all agreements that existed on July 1
or were entered into until December 31, 1983, and which benefit from the
old block exemption under Regulation 67/67.86 If the parties desire to
continue with such agreements beyond January 1, 1987, they will have to
make sure that the agreements comply with the provisions of the new
regulations, or they will have to notify them to the Commission.87
84. Agreements satisfying the conditions of either Regulation 1983/83 or 1984/83 "need not
be notified," Recital Nos. 14 and 22, respectively (the "Whereas" clauses in the preamble to
each regulation). See also Cadillon v. H6ss, supra note 24, where the CoJ held that agreements
"could qualify for the group exemption, even though they were not registered with the
Commission, provided that they fulfilled the special conditions set forth in Articles I to 3 of that
regulation." Id. at 7543.
85. As to further details of the similarities and differences between the two new regulations
see Commission Notice Concerning Regulations No. 1983/83 and No. 1984/83 On The Applica-
tion Of Article 85(3) Of The Treaty To Categories Of Exclusive Distribution and Exclusive
Purchasing Agreements, O.J. C 101, p. 2, of April 13, 1984, C.M.R. 10,583 (hereinafter the
"Commission Explanation"). This Notice replaced an earlier Commission Notice on the same
subject of December 30, 1983. It "sets out the main considerations which will determine the
Commission's view of whether or not an exclusive distribution or purchasing agreement is
covered by the block exemption." Commission Explanation, at para. 3.
86. Article 7, Regulation 1983/83, and Article 15, Regulation 1984/83, respectively.
87. Special provisions have now been introduced with respect to beer supply and service




The scope of the two new regulations has been defined in Article 16,
Regulation 1984/83 so as to avoid any overlap. Agreements by which the
supplier undertakes with the dealer to supply only him with certain goods for
resale, and the dealer undertakes to purchase these goods only from the
supplier, are outside the scope of Regulation 1984/83. They are exclusively
covered by Regulation 1983/83.
B. EEC-WIDE DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS AND "RESALE" AGREEMENTS
As under Regulation 67/67, the block exemption under both new regula-
tions applies only to agreements "for resale." However, the exclusive
distribution exemption today permits the parties to stipulate resale within
the whole or a defined area of the Common Market. Thus, EEC-wide
distribution agreements are covered by Article 1, Regulation 1983/83 and
benefit from the block exemption regulation. This represents a remarkable
extension of the regulation as compared with the old rule under Regulation
67/67, and it expressly overrules the decision in Duro-DynelEuropair. 88
Similarly, the applicability of the new block exemption regulation has
been extended by eliminating the restriction contained in Article 1(2),
Regulation 67/67, pursuant to which purely national agreements, i.e.,
agreements between companies from one member state only, did not ben-
efit from the block exemption. On the other hand, the restrictions resulting
from the notion that the agreement must be concluded "for resale" remain
the same today as they were under the old regulation. If the contract goods
are purchased and later transformed or processed into other goods, or used
or consumed in the production of different goods, the agreement is not one
for resale and the exemption under Article 1, Regulation 1983/83 will not
apply. 89 However, such contracts are obviously not prohibited in the EEC
notwithstanding the fact they may be subject to Article 85 (1). The lack of
availability of the block exemption simply means that a single-case exemp-
tion has to be obtained and that the agreement must be notified to the
Commission.
Where the dealer merely improves the quality, durability, appearance, or
taste of the contract goods, 9°' the block exemption remains in effect with
respect to such exclusive distribution contract, if the value added to the
contract goods by such operation does not change the economic identity of
the goods. A slight addition in value will not be considered a change of the
economic identity of the contract goods. 91 Although it is nowhere explained
88. See supra note 83.
89. Cf., Commission Explanation, supra note 85, at para. 9.
90. Examples would be rust-proofing of metals, sterilization of food, or the addition of
coloring matter or flavorings to drugs; cf. Commission Explanation, supra note 85, at para. 10.
91. Commission Explanation, at para 10.
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what constitutes, and what exceeds "slight addition in value," it is sug-
gested, in keeping with the general interpretation of de minimis situations in
EEC law, that 5 percent added value in respect to the dealer's purchase price
will not remove the benefit of block exemption from an exclusive distribu-
92tion agreement.
The agreement is "for resale" if the dealer merely breaks up and packs the
goods into other packages prior to reselling them. Repackaging does not
change the economic identity of the contract goods. This applies also to
situations where the reseller is supplied with a concentrated extract for a
drink which he bottles after diluting it with water, pure alcohol, or another
liquid.93
Exclusive distribution agreements under which the dealer not only resells
the contract goods, but leases them to third parties, are covered by Regula-
tion 1983/83. This is a welcome clarification of the law as compared with the
situation that existed prior to adoption of the new regulation. 95
C. SUPPLY OF SERVICES AGREEMENTS
Since Article 1, Regulation 1983/83 specifies that the agreement for resale
must be concluded with respect to "certain goods" (as did Article 1(1)(a),
Regulation 67/67), a contract for the supply of services is not covered by the
regulation. Nevertheless, an obligation imposed on the reseller to provide
after-sales services that can be considered incidental to the sale of the
contract goods, does not change the character of the agreement from one
"for resale" to an agreement for the supply of services. As in the case of
determining the economic identity of the contract goods, the decisive crite-
rion is the money value added to the contract by the rendition of these
after-sales services. If the charge for the service is higher than the price of
the goods, the block exemption will not apply to the agreement. Presum-
ably, trade usage will play an important role in individual case-by-case
determinations, as it does, according to the Commission's own announce-
ment, in cases of defining the economic identity of the contract goods. 94
D. NON-COMPETE CLAUSE
Like the old regulation, both new block exemption regulations contain an
exhaustive list of restrictions of competition that may be imposed on the
92. Cf., supra note 8. Note also the 10% "grace" range provided for in Article 5(2),
Regulation 1983/83, with respect to the financial limits established as a criterion for the
regulation's applicability. If such limits may be exceeded by up to 10%, it could perhaps be
argued that such greater latitude should also apply to the added value percentage used in
defining the economic identity of the contract goods.
93. Commission Explanation, at paras. 9 and 10.
94. Cf., Commission Explanation, at para. 12.
95. Id., at para. 10.
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exclusive distributor/purchaser. These restrictions are enumerated in Arti-
cle 2, subparagraph (2) of the two new regulations and their inclusion into a
contract does not result in an obligation for the companies involved to notify
their contract to the Commission. These provisions contain the familiar
non-compete clause that can be included in exclusive distribution or pur-
chasing agreements. However, different from the situation prior to 1983,
dealers can be restricted in their freedom to compete only for the duration of
the agreement. Under Article 2(1)(a), Regulation 67/67, it was permissible
to prohibit the exclusive dealer from manufacturing or distributing compet-
ing goods until one year after expiration of the exclusive distribution con-
tract. This is no longer possible without having to notify the agreement for
an exemption.
Manufacturers can also be restricted from competing with their exclusive
dealers. Article 2(1), Regulation 1983/83 permits, as did its predecessor, a
prohibition imposed on the manufacturer to supply the contract goods to
users, including end-users, in the dealer's territory. This restriction of
competition does not require notification. However, the restriction must not
be absolute. The Commission has made it clear in a recent case that the
benefit of block exemption will be removed from an exclusive distribution
agreement, if the manufacturer refuses to enter into a contract with a
consumer resident in the dealer's territory, who approaches the manufactur-
er at its place of business. If in such a case the manufacturer does not sell and
deliver the contract goods to the consumer, the block exemption under
Regulation 1983/83 will no longer apply to the manufacturer's relationship
with the exclusive dealer. 96 The only protection remaining for the dealer in
this situation is the requirement that the contract goods must be delivered to
the consumer outside the dealer's territory.
On the other hand, the manufacturer may retain a contractual right to
supply certain customers in the dealer's territory himself. Provided the
customers in question are not resellers, such contractual right may be
included in the distribution agreement and this would not remove the
agreement from Regulation 1983/83, irrespective of whether this contrac-
tual right of direct supply of end-users is granted in consideration of a
compensation/commission payment to the exclusive dealer or not.
E. MINIMUM PURCHASE OBLIGATION
Article 2(3) of both new regulations contains other obligations that may
be undertaken by the exclusive dealer/purchaser without prejudicing the
block exemption under Article 1, Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83, respec-
96. Cf., Commission Press Release No. IP(84) 16, in the matter ofATP, a French furniture
trading company, Bulletin EC 1-1984, point 2.1.33.
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tively. This list in Article 2(3) is a non-exhaustive enumeration of examples,
only. A familiar feature known since the days of Regulation 67/67 is the
obligation to purchase complete ranges of goods, or minimum quantities.
However, an interesting difference between the two new regulations
emerges with respect to the minimum purchase obligation imposed upon an
exclusive dealer as compared with such obligation undertaken by an exclu-
sive purchaser. While Article 2(3)(a), Regulation 1983/83 continues the old,
unlimited language of Regulation 67/67, the provision dealing with the
purchase of minimum quantities in the new exclusive purchasing regulation,
namely Article 2(3)(b), Regulation 1984/83, contains the limitation that
such obligation may only be imposed with respect to goods "which are
subject to the exclusive purchasing obligation."
The question is whether this limitation also applies to the exclusive
distribution agreements covered by Regulation 1983/83. The text of that
regulation's Article 2(3)(a) suggests that this is not the case. Nevertheless,
the Commission's admonition in its recent Notice concerning the new block
exemption regulation should be kept in mind.9 7 The Commission warned
that, in order to retain the benefit of block exemption, all obligations in
exclusive distribution agreements must be formulated in a non-restrictive
manner, considering the special relationship that exists between manufac-
turer and exclusive distributor. Where the parties include obligations re-
strictive of competition beyond the character of their special contractual
relationship, the agreement as a whole is no longer covered by the block
exemption and requires an individual exemption. This would mean that the
parties would have to notify their agreement. A minimum purchase obliga-
tion relating to goods that are not the main subject of an exclusive distribu-
tion agreement could trigger this effect if it was too broad, restricting the
dealer's commercial conduct in unrelated areas.
F. USE RESTRICTIONS
The non-exhaustive character of the list of obligations falling under
Article 2(3) of both new regulations can be demonstrated by pointing to use
restrictions as an example of a contractual provision that may, under certain
circumstances, be covered although not mentioned in Article 2(3), Regula-
tion 1983/83 or 1984/83. While usually subject to Article 85(1) and thus
prohibited in EEC distribution agreements,9" unless exempted under Arti-
cle 85(3), such use restrictions may be imposed as a condition of sale at all
levels of distribution without reaching the threshold of Article 85(1), where
97. Cf., Commission Explanation, at para. 19.
98. Ciments et Betons de 1'Est v. Kerpen & Kerpen, supra note 19, at paras. 6 and 7 of the
judgment (not yet published).
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they are inevitable for the health and safety of humans. 99 An exclusive
dealing agreement with respect to products involving a health safety risk can
therefore contain a provision imposing use restrictions on the dealer and all
subsequent purchasers, without thereby creating a need to notify the agree-
ment. This shows that it would be a mistake to assume that contract clauses
not explicitly exempted under Article 2(3) of both new regulations are
automatically prohibited.1 00
G. BLOCK EXEMPTION INCOMPATIBILITY
As an example of provisions incompatible with the block exemption
regulation, the Commission has mentioned a prohibition imposed on the
exclusive distributor to supply certain categories of customers in his contract
territory, as for instance department stores which are reserved for other
resellers appointed by the manufacturer for that purpose. '0' It is, however,
possible to restrict resellers from supplying the contract goods to unsuitable
dealers who do not qualify for the distribution of the particular product in
question. This follows from the provision contained in Article 2(3)(c),
Regulation 1983/83,102 under which the exclusive distributor may be re-
quired to "maintain a sales network." This must be read in conjunction with
the controlling language of that particular subparagraph, which permits
imposing measures on exclusive dealers "for promotion of sales." This
results in a combined obligation for exclusive distributors to promote
distribution networks established by the manufacturer. These are workable
only where the criteria for dealer selection, defined by the manufacturer,
have to be observed by appointed dealers. Therefore, such clauses are
unobjectionable and the agreement does not have to be notified for exemp-
tion, if admission to the network is based on objective criteria of a qualita-
tive nature, as described above in the section on selective distribution. 103
99. Cf., Commission Notice in the matter of Kathon Biocide, O.J. No. C 59, p. 6, of March
1, 1984, C.M.R. 10,571. There, the Commission proposed to issue a "negative clearance" to a
system of monitoring and limiting all sales of a hazardous product to avoid mishandling, i.e.,
took the position that Article 85(1) was not applicable. An example of a use restriction violating
Article 85(1) and failing to qualify for exemption under Article 85(3) is the Commission's
Decision of December 10, 1982, in the matter of Cafeteros de Colombia, O.J. No. L 360, p. 32,
of December 21,1982, C.M.R. $ 10,448. Contracts between the Colombian Coffee Federation
and distributors in the EEC contained the restriction that the raw coffee sold by the Colombians
had to be used by the buyers in their own roasting plants or could only be sold to predetermined
roasters approved by the Colombian supplier. This amounted to an illegal ban on the sale of
green coffee.
100. The CoJ has ruled in this sense as early as 1966, in Italy v. EEC Council and EEC
Commission, supra note 7, where it held: "This does not mean, however, that everything that is
not exempt must be considered to be prohibited." Id. at 7717.
101. Commission Explanation, at para. 29.
102. See also corresponding provision Article 2(3)(d), Regulation 1984/83 for exclusive
purchasing agreements.
103. Cf., also Commission Explanation, at para. 20.
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On the other hand, contract clauses providing for, and actual business
conduct of the contract parties leading to absolute territorial protection for
the exclusive distributor are incompatible with the block exemption. It is
imperative that parallel importers retain the ability, legally and practically,
to sell the contract goods inside the distributor's exclusive sales territory,
and that consumers residing there remain in a position to buy in other EEC
countries. Otherwise, Regulation 1983/83 shall not apply, pursuant to its
own terms laid down in Article 3, subparagraphs (c) and (d).
It is safe to assume that in cases of absolute territorial protection not even
a single-case exemption would be granted. 0 4 Notification of the agreement
would therefore not make a difference. Manufacturers/suppliers may never
seek to prohibit their exclusive dealers from selling outside their allotted
territory, they may only prohibit them from canvassing there, Article
2(2)(c), Regulation 1983/83. Further, a manufacturer/supplier may never
commit to his exclusive distributor to prevent his buyers elsewhere from
supplying the contract goods to users inside the exclusive sales territory; he
may only agree to that supply prohibition for himself, Article 2(1), Regula-
tion 1983/83.
The block exemption under both new regulations is also not applicable to
exclusive agreements between competing manufacturers.' 05 Different from
the situation prevailing prior to 1983, both reciprocal and non-reciprocal
exclusive agreements between competitors are excluded from the benefit of
block exemption. The only exception to this new rule are non-reciprocal
agreements, where one or both of the contract parties are of smaller size. If
the total annual sales (aggregate sales, not just sales of the contract goods) of
at least one of the parties are less than 100 million ECU, the agreement does
not have to be notified and the parties are spared the single-case exemption
scrutiny of their contract. Special provisions exist in Articles 4 and 5 of both
regulations with respect to calculating aggregate sales among "connected"
companies. Generally speaking, a connected enterprise is a company in a
parent/subsidiary relationship to the contract party.
A further significant difference to the old law of exclusive distribution
exists today with Article 3(d), Regulation 1983/83. The block exemption is
104. Cf., Commission Decision of July 11, 1983, in the matter of Windsurfing International,
O.J. No. L 229, p. 1, of August 20, 1983, C.M.R. 10,515. In this case, exclusive dealing
agreements contained a ban preventing the sole distributor not only from pursuing any active
sales policy outside his allotted territory, but also from furnishing any supplies of the contract
goods whatsoever. The Commission held that this clause removed the agreements from
Regulation 67/67 and went on to say that, had the agreements been notified, an exemption
would not have been possible: "In any event . . . the complete ban on any supplies to other
dealers, including therefore those in the distribution system itself, would have imposed too
great a restriction." Id. at p. 11,174. The Commission imposed fines on the companies involved
for this violation of Article 85(1).
105. Articles 3(a)(b), Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83, respectively. See also Comp. Rep.
1982, point 81, regarding the matter of Cansulex.
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inapplicable where the parties "make it difficult for intermediaries or con-
sumers to obtain the contract goods from other dealers." While this limita-
tion used to apply only with respect to dealers within the Common Market,
as explicitly stated in Article 3(b), Regulation 67/67, the new law provides
that the block exemption shall not be available, if the parties interfere with
someone's attempt to obtain the contract goods from outside the Common
Market, insofar as no alternative source of supply is available inside the
EEC.
This has to be considered a natural extension of the scope of this provision
in view of the legality introduced with Regulation 1983/83, to conclude
EEC-wide distribution agreements, yet not to lose the benefit of block
exemption. Where the contract territory covers the whole of the Common
Market, alternative sources of supply could not exist inside the EEC, by
definition.
However, this new rule is problematic and may lead to a conflict with the
Commission which may have to be litigated, in cases where the contract
parties, either the manufacturer or the dealer, exercise an industrial or
commercial property right, such as a trademark, to oppose the import from
outside the Common Market of products properly marked or otherwise
properly marketed there. Article 3(d) in its new form may well be in
violation of prior decisions of the CoJ in the EM1 v. CBS judgments of
1976.106
There, the Court had ruled that EEC law does not prevent the owner of a
trademark from exercising his rights to block importation from outside the
Common Market of products bearing the identical mark owned by a third
party in a non-EEC country. The "exhaustion of rights" doctrine estab-
lished by the CoJ with respect to the exercise of industrial or commercial
property rights in intra-EEC trade1 17 does therefore not apply to the im-
portation of goods from countries outside the Common Market. This un-
equivocal ruling in EMI v. CBS was subsequently confirmed in Polydor Ltd.
v. Harlequin Record Shops. 108
Thus, it appears that Article 3(d), Regulation 1983/83, goes beyond this
Court jurisprudence-at least in cases where the exercise of a trademark
right is unilateral, that is an exercise by the trademark owner himself and not
by the dealer under an assignment of the trademark right. The dealer's use
106. CoJ, judgments of June 15, 1976; Case 51/75 EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United
Kingdom Ltd., [1976] E.C.R. 811; C.M.R. 8350; Case 86/75 EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS
Grammofon A/S [1976] E.C.R. 871; C.M.R. 9 8351; and Case 96/75 EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS
Schallplatten GmbH; [1976] E.C.R. 913; C.M.R. 8352.
107. Cf. Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, supra note 29. For a detailed discussion of this subject
see TOEPKE, EEC COMPETITION LAW, supra note 7, at chapter 71.
108. Polydor Ltd. and RSO Records Inc. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd., et al., CoJ of
February 9, 1982, Case 270/80, [1982] E.C.R. 329, C.M.R. 8806.
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of a trademark in such situation may constitute the "object, the means, or
the result of an agreement which, by prohibiting imports . . . would have
the effect of partitioning the market."10 9 The trademark owner's use of his
right, however, appears legitimate under EMI v. CBS and under Polydor v.
Harlequin. It may well be that the Court, if and when faced with the
question, would hold that Article 3(d), Regulation 1983/83, is too broad and
does not apply in cases of unilateral exercise of a trademark.
For companies to benefit from the block exemption of the two new
regulations it is not necessary that they enter into a legally binding contract.
Different from the situation that existed under Regulation 67/67, concerted
practices are now also subject to the block exemption.' 10 If two companies
merely operate an exclusive distribution or purchasing arrangement with-
out, however, reducing it to writing, it is still covered by Regulation 1983/83
and 1984/83, respectively, i.e., it does not have to be notified to the Com-
mission.
H. ExCLUSIVE SALES TERRITORY SIZE
Under the old rules of Regulation 67/67 ambiguity persisted for some time
as to the permissible size of the exclusive sales territory of the distributor, in
both directions. The maximum size was unclear until Duro-Dyne/Europair
was decided in 1974. This decision clarified that the parties could not agree
on the entire Common Market as contract territory. Today, however, this is
possible as was already pointed out, pursuant to the explicit language of
Article 1, Regulation 1983/83. The minimum size of an exclusive sales
territory permissible under Regulation 67/67 remained unclear until the
regulation's expiration.
Even today, under Regulation 1983/83, it is not settled how small the
"defined area of the Common Market," i.e., the exclusive sales territory,
may be drawn without losing the benefit of block exemption. The decision in
Junghans highlights the importance of this question since the obligations
undertaken in this case by the German manufacturer and its three exclusive
dealers in Belgium were not automatically exempt from Article 85(1), but
109. Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, supra note 45, at 7192. Such exercise of a trademark
would, with respect to intra-EEC trade, constitute illegal action violating Article 85(1), Sirena
v. Eda, CoJ of February 18, 1971, Case 40/70, 17 Rec. 69 [1971], C.M.R. 8101. The Court held
that "Article 85 ... applies if the importation of products coming from different Member
States and carrying the same trademark is prevented by invoking the trademark right, where
the owners of the trademark acquired this mark or the right to use it under agreements between
them or agreements with third parties." Id. at p. 7112. See also the earlier judgment in Grundig,
Consten, supra note 16. Presumably, Article 85(1) would also apply where imports from
non-EEC countries are prevented by an agreement, permitting the use of a trademark for such
purpose.
110. Article 9, Regulation 1983/83, and Article 18, Regulation 1984/83.
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had to be notified to the Commission for a single-case exemption, because
"Junghans [did] not supply only one dealer in the contractual territory, as
required by Article 1(1)(a) of the Regulation, but three." 111 The mistake
made by the manufacturer in this situation was apparently the choice of the
whole of Belgium as the "defined area," or contractual territory in the
meaning of Article 1(1)(a), Regulation 67/67. If the company had wanted to
appoint three exclusive dealers in Belgium and still benefit from block
exemption, the sales area for each dealer should have been defined on a
smaller scale, such as a district or province of Belgium, or a large city.
The proper delineation of the exclusive sales territory reserved for one
dealer remains as important under Regulation 1983/83 as it was under
Regulation 67/67. Unfortunately, the ambiguity as to the smallest permissi-
ble size of such territory has not been cleared up by the Commission. The
prudent thing to do if one wants to avoid having to notify an agreement, is to
draft a detailed description of the allotted sales area. There appears to be no
limit to how small a portion of a single member state a manufacturer may
choose for the appointment of an exclusive distributor. It is clear that the
benefit of block exemption is not lost, if one enters into exclusive distribu-
tion or purchasing agreements covering the same goods with several
resellers.1 1 2 There is no limitation on the number of exclusive distribution or
exclusive purchasing agreements that a manufacturer may conclude in the
EEC. Therefore, the requirement of both block exemption regulations that
the agreement be a bilateral one relates only to the individual agreement." 3
Once an exclusive sales territory has been established, the manufacturer/
supplier will normally have to deal within that territory only with his exclu-
sive distributor. However, this does not mean that the benefit of block
exemption is lost where the manufacturer/supplier provides the contract
goods to other resellers who subsequently sell them in the dealer's exclusive
territory, regardless of where these other resellers are located (they may
even reside inside the territory). The only conditions are that the contract of
sale comes about at the reseller's request, not as a result of the manufactur-
111. Junghans, supra note 35, at 9963-8.
112. Commission Explanation, at para. 14.
113. A bilateral agreement would still exist, if on one side of the agreement several com-
panies participated which belong to one economic unit, like sister companies of a conglomer-
ate, cf. Commission Explanation, at para. 13. However, where one or both of the parties to the
agreement are associations with a large membership, such as a trade union association or a
manufacturers' association, they cannot be regarded as "undertakings" in the meaning of
Article 1, Regulation 1983/83 or 1984/83, respectively. Consequently, the block exemption
would be inapplicable in such a case, Salonia v. Poidomani, supra note 39, at 9102 (with respect
to the old, identical phrase in Article 1, Regulation 67/67). For this reason an agreement
concluded by an Export Trading Company, as they now exist in the United States, will normally
not qualify as a bilateral one, unless care is taken that such company is created as a separate
legal entity which holds title to the contract goods for which an exclusive distribution agreement
is concluded in the EEC.
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er's marketing efforts, and that the contract goods are delivered to the
reseller or his agent outside the territory reserved for the exclusive
distributor. 114
I. DURATION OF EXCLUSIVE CONTRACT
The duration of the exclusivity contract must be carefully reviewed under
the new EEC regulations. Exclusive purchasing agreements, for instance,
may not be concluded for an indefinite period or for a period of more than
five years, or the parties will lose the benefit of block exemption. 1 5 Exclu-
sive distribution agreements, on the other hand, can apparently be con-
cluded for an indefinite period, without creating the need to notify the
contract. Agreements specifying a fixed term, but which are automatically
renewable unless one of the parties gives notice to terminate, will be
considered to have been concluded for an indefinite period. 16 Therefore,
such a contract would benefit from block exemption only if it was an
exclusive distribution agreement, but would fail to qualify under Regulation
1984/83.
J. BLOCK EXEMPTION WITHDRAWAL
In certain situations the Commission may order a withdrawal of the block
exemption, Articles 6 and 14, Regulation 1983/83 and 1984/83, respectively.
The examples mentioned in these two articles are only illustrations, not an
exhaustive list of reasons for which the benefits of block exemption may be
withdrawn from an individual agreement. 1 7 Among other cases, that of a
dominant manufacturer distributing its goods by means of exclusive dis-
tribution agreements deserves attention. Generally speaking, dominant
companies may enter into such agreements like any other manufacturer or
supplier. However, where the contract goods are not subject to effective
competition in the contract territory, as may be the case with products
manufactured by a dominant firm, Article 6(a), Regulation 1983/83 empow-
ers the Commission to withdraw from such exclusive distribution agreement
the benefit of block exemption. It should also be kept in mind that Article
86, Treaty of Rome, remains applicable at all times to dominant companies,
irrespective of whether Regulation 1983/83 applies to an individual agree-
ment concluded by such company.
114. Commission Explanation, at para. 27. In a situation like this the reseller has to pay the
transportation cost of the contract goods into the sales territory, otherwise the block exemption
is withdrawn, id.
115. Article 3(d), Regulation 1984/83.
116. Commission Explanation, at para. 39.
117. Id. at para. 24.
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The withdrawal of block exemption in individual cases requires a formal
decision by the Commission under the rules of Regulation 17/62. The
Commission must, therefore, first conduct a regular investigation, applying
all the procedural rules applicable in other competition cases, before an
agreement otherwise benefitting from the protection of either Regulation
1983/83 or 1984/83 can be declared violative of Article 85(1). Thus, the
companies involved have an opportunity to argue their point of view and the
ultimate decision, even if negative, cannot have retroactive effect. 118
K. EXEMPTION UNDER ARTICLE 85(3)
As a final comment regarding exclusivity agreements and their treatment
under the old and new block exemption regulations in the EEC, readers are
reminded of the flexibility of the administrative process in the Common
Market. Where an individual agreement is excluded from the block exemp-
tion of either regulation, as a result of its terms, it may still be eligible for
exemption under Article 85(3), depending on the circumstances. Such
exclusion from the block exemption does not prejudice an agreement in any
way as regards a single-case exemption. However, if falling outside the
provisions of Regulation 1983/83 or 1984/83, an agreement must be notified,
if an exemption is desired.
Admittedly, certain contract clauses will make such an exemption highly
unlikely, such as those providing for absolute territorial protection. The
Commission's objective to ensure intrabrand competition at all stages of
distribution in intra-EEC trade, documented in its many decisions in this
respect, will likely override any potential benefits otherwise derived from
such agreement in the particular case. Similarly, provisions interfering with
dealers' choices of their customers and their freedom to determine prices
and other sales conditions can hardly be considered candidates for a single-
case exemption. They certainly do not qualify under the block exemption
regulations.
IV. Conclusions
The preceding discussion has hopefully helped clarify the basic questions
relating to the need to notify a particular distribution agreement in the
Common Market. Of course, details will remain ambiguous in certain
situations simply because no decision may as yet exist in the EEC that can
provide guidance in the given circumstances, or because the new block
exemption regulations of 1983 may not be entirely clear when applied to an
individual case.
118. Id.
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EEC competition law, however, provides a procedure for companies
seeking advice from the Commission as to the compatibility of their agree-
ments, or certain provisions in an agreement, with Article 85(1). They may
file an application for "negative clearance" pursuant to Article 2, Regula-
tion 17/62, in effect thereby notifying such agreement. 119 By making such an
application the company concerned can request the Commission to certify
that its agreement is not in violation of Article 85(1) or, alternatively, to
grant an exemption under Article 85(3). In cases of doubt a company should
avail itself of this opportunity and file such a combined application for
negative clearance or exemption. It is strongly recommended to notify an
agreement with questionable provisions, as the decision not to notify risking
a violation of Article 85(1) entails the acceptance of a substantial level of
legal uncertainty regarding the enforcement of the contract, or certain of its
provisions. Should such enforcement become necessary the danger exists
that the other party to the agreement may seek to use Article 85(2) to escape
its contractual obligations. The possibility of attracting a fine for violation of
Article 85(1) poses another risk. That this risk is real even in case of
distribution agreements can be demonstrated by pointing to the Commis-
sion's decision of July 1983 regarding Windsurfing International.120
The fact that the Commission customarily has not moved speedily upon
receiving an application for negative clearance and/or exemption under
Article 85(3) should not discourage companies from notifying their agree-
ments. First, even if a decision of exemption or negative clearance does not
issue from the Commission quickly, the notification of an agreement is still
of some practical value. No fine can be imposed with respect to notified
agreements or practices, and in case of litigation before a national court
raising the issue of enforceability of a particular contract clause or the whole
distribution agreement, a pending application for an exemption may be
sufficient to convince the court not to rule under Article 85(1) until the
Commission has decided whether an exemption can be granted in the
individual case or not.' 2'
119. Such application has to be submitted on Form A/B which is also used for notification of
agreements in order to gain exemption under Article 85(3). The filing procedure is laid down in
Regulation 27/62 of May 3, 1962, O.J. (Special Edition 1959-1962), p. 132, C.M.R. 2651.
120. Supra, note 104.
121. Whether it is helpful in such a situation to gain a stay from the national court depends, of
course, on whether one is the plaintiff or the defendant in the action. If it is in a party's interest
to have the question of EEC compatibility of a particular contract resolved quickly, a motion to
the national court should be made to refer to the CoJ any question the national court may have
about the relevance of applicability of EEC law, including the question whether an exemption
under Article 85(3) of the disputed contract clause or agreement may be possible in the
particular case. The Commission has taken the position that national courts should be entitled
to refer questions regarding Article 85(3) to the CoJ for a preliminary ruling, notwithstanding
the fact that national courts do not have jurisdiction to decide this question themselves. Cf.
Procureur v. Giry and Guerlain et al. (the Perfumes decision), supra note 16, at p. 8524. For
more details see TOEPKE, EEC COMPETITION LAW, supra note 7, at 685 et seq. and 798 et seq.
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Secondly, there is hope that the Commission may dispose of many cases
much more rapidly now than in the past, at least in situations where a
"typical," ordinary distribution agreement has been notified. Such an agree-
ment would either be an arrangement containing only provisions of the type
previously permitted by the Commission as compatible with Article 85(1)-
which were discussed above--or provisions that have been exempted earlier
in similar situations by decisions under Article 85(3). The hope for more
expeditious treatment of applications involving such agreements is founded
on the Commission's announcements of December 1982 and November
1983, respectively, "to open the way for a more flexible administrative
practice in assessing applications for negative clearance"' 122 and likewise in
"assessing notifications under Article 4 of Regulation No. 17/62. ' ' 123
These Commission Notices of 1982 and 1983 have established a new
administrative procedure for handling both an application for negative
clearance and for exemption which, in certain "typical" situations, may
result in a considerable acceleration of the notoriously slow Commission
proceedings involving notified agreements. In its two cited Notices, the
Commission indicated its intention to send companies a so-called comfort
letter or provisional letter in lieu of a formal decision in certain cases. Such
letter would inform the applicant that no further action is warranted in
respect to the notified agreement (or practice) and that the file on the case
can be closed. In cases of application for a negative clearance this would
establish that the Commission feels, on the basis of information in its
possession, that the notified agreement does not violate Article 85(1). In
cases where an exemption under Article 85(3) has been applied for, such a
letter would mean that the Commission, on a provisional basis, takes the
position that the notified agreement, while in violation of Article 85(1),
would be eligible for an exemption but that the Commission does not
consider it necessary to follow the formal procedure through to the issuance
of an exemption decision. Several such comfort letters have meanwhile been
sent and a number of cases have thus been terminated without the delay
experienced in prior years.
124
It may be surprising to many observers that a procedure as noncommittal
as the mailing of a comfort letter should take the place of a formal decision of
122. Commission Notice On Procedures Concerning Applications For Negative Clearance
Pursuant To Article 2 Of Council Regulation No. 17/62, O.J. No. C 343, p. 4, December 31,
1982. Cf. also Comp. Rep. 1981, point 15, and Comp. Rep. 1982, point 30.
123. Commission Notice On Procedures Concerning Notifications Pursuant to Article 4 Of
Council Regulation No. 17/62, O.J. No. C 295, p. 6, November 2, 1983, Cf. also Comp. Rep.
1983, point 72.
124. Cf., Notice concerning an application for negative clearance (IV/30477) re: Europages,
O.J. No. C 343, p. 4, December 31, 1982, and application for negative clearance (IV/30946) re:
Kathon Biocide, supra note 99. See also, Notice concerning notification pursuant to Article 4,
Reg. 17/62 for exemption (IV/30778) re: Rovin, O.J. No. C 295, p. 6, November 2, 1983.
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constitutive character, such as an exemption decision under Article 85(3). In
the case of applications for negative clearance the change may appear less
drastic, but a Commission decision under Article 85(3) transforms an illegal,
potentially void agreement into a legal, enforceable contract. To forego
such a decision is therefore clearly detrimental to the applicant. 125 For this
reason, the Commission will apply its new accelerated procedure of sending
a comfort or provisional letter to applicants for exemption only if the
companies involved agree to this procedure and thereby waive their right to
receive a formal decision.
126
The increase in speed and flexibility in the enforcement of EEC competi-
tion rules resulting from this new Commission procedure is clearly an
improvement, and companies have reacted favorably, despite the criticism
voiced by politicians in Europe.127 The fact remains, though, that such a
provisional letter does not have the status of a decision. It can therefore
neither be appealed to the CoJ nor does it provide the protection resulting
from decisions in case of attacks by third parties (or even the contract
partner) directed at the agreement. However, it seems this is not too high a
price to pay for the increase in speed in obtaining an opinion from the
Commission concerning a notified agreement.
The alternative is chaos, i.e., legal uncertainty of much greater propor-
tion and duration than experienced before. At year end 1981, there were
approximately 4,000 applications for exemption pending at the Commis-
sion, increasing at an annual rate of about 200.128 The prospect of having an
exemption granted to one's agreement faded further and further for the
average applicant, i.e., a company that could not claim a test-case character
125. One must remember the CoJ's ruling in Brasserie de Haecht, supra note 22, according to
which companies that have concluded agreements violative of Article 85(1) can implement
them only at their own risk and peril, as long as the Commission has not issued an exemption
decision.
126. Comp. Rep. 1983, point 72. There, the Commission states as follows: "A provisional
letter will only be sent if the undertakings involved agree to the procedure being closed in this
manner." This and other announcements of recent time seem to signal a distinction the
Commission wants to make with respect to comfort letters mailed in response to an application
for a negative clearance and those closing the file on applications for an exemption. This is
justified, given the important difference in legal character of both types of Commission
decision. Also, the terminology appears to become clearer now, after initial ambiguity using the
term "comfort letter" indiscriminately. Lately, the Commission seems to prefer the term
"administrative letter" for both categories (see Comp. Rep. 1983-§ 10 procedural issues), and
uses "provisional letter" for those mailings that are in lieu of a formal exemption. This would
leave the expression "comfort letter" as a label for the letters that are sent in response to
negative clearance applications. This is a welcome distinction to avoid confusion.
127. Cf., Commission Answer to Written Question No. 813/82 by Mr. Prout, Member
Europ. Parliament, O.J. No. C 275, p. 15, October 18, 1982, C.M.R. 10,427. See also
Commission Answer to Written Questions No. 874/82 by Mr. Tyrell and No. 291/82 by Mrs.
Walz, both Members Europ. Parliament, O.J. No. C 287, p. 22, November 4, 1982, C.M.R.
10,432, and O.J. No. C 221, p. 9, August 25, 1982, C.M.R. 10,422, respectively.
128. Comp. Rep. 1981, point 15.
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with respect to its agreement (and thus could not expect any particular
interest on the Commission's part to take an early decision for creating new
case law). The average time for obtaining an exemption stood at five years
several years ago, and nobody has a clue today, when applying for an
exemption, whether he will live to see his case decided in Brussels.
To receive a comfort or provisional letter from the Commission within a
reasonable time is therefore an improvement which appears like the second-
best solution to none. In addition, the Commission has taken an important
step to enhance the legal certainty attached to administrative letters by
adopting its new approach, announced in the 1982 and 1983 Notices, 29 of
publishing the main contents of a notified agreement in the Official Journal.
Even if no formal decision issues in the case, the Commission itself appears
to accept that, by publishing these administrative letters in the Official
Journal, they are of legal value in proceedings before national courts and do
not just have simple declaratory character.1 30
This view should be endorsed. Comfort or provisional letters can, given
the procedural enhancement of publication, provide a legal basis for the
recipient company that should prove determinative in any proceeding be-
fore a national court raising the compatibility of a particular agreement with
EEC law (provided that the Commission had all the relevant facts when
sending its closing letter). In this way, the unsatisfactory situation of the
past, resulting from the enormous delays after notification of most agree-
ments, can be resolved. One can, and indeed should, take the position with
respect to the civil enforceability of a contract that the effects of an exemp-
tion provided for under Article 85(3) are impliedly granted where the
Commission has not taken a formal decision to exempt the agreement, or to
reject exemption within a reasonable period, but where it has carried out a
preliminary examination of the notified agreement, as evidenced by its
administrative letter, and has given interested third parties an opportunity
to submit their comments under the applicable procedural rules.' 3'
Without such a rule the present dilemma of legal uncertainty will continue
with respect to many notified agreements, and companies that decide to
notify will continue to be unjustly penalized by such uncertainty. The
alternative route taken by many companies in view of this dilemma too often
is the decision not to notify in order to keep a particular agreement unde-
tected, thus sometimes accepting a much greater risk.
129. Supra notes 122 and 123.
130. Cf., Commission Answer to Written Question No. 813/82, supra note 127.
131. There is precedent in existing EEC law for such an opposition procedure leading to a
presumed or automatic exemption in Article 12, Regulation 1017/68. O.J. No. L 175, p. 1, of
July 23, 1983, C.M.R. 2761. This regulation applied the EEC competition rules to transport
by rail, road and inland waterway. The Commission has now incorporated equivalent provi-
sions in its proposal for a similar regulation extending the competition rules to air and sea
transport, see O.J. No. C282, p. 4, of November 5, 1981, and O.J. No. C291, p. 4,of November
17, 1981, C.M.R. 10,339 and $ 10,322, respectively.
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